> Boeing officials encouraged test pilots to “remember, get right on that pickle switch”
That just sounds like such a heartless, psychopathic thing to do. How could they not feel guilty, knowing that their actions could potentially lead to hundreds of people losing their lives?
It reminds me of Lance Armstrong's common refrain before he was outed as a drug cheat, "I am the most tested athlete in professional sports and I have never been found guilty of taking performance enhancing drugs!" All while he was a heavy drug user.
If one were to down again, it would immediately be assumed FAA is to blame for not catching yet another issue so them reapproving is putting their reputation on the line.
Also boeing is on thin ice. They would not weather another incident like this.
So in this case, I think it does mean extreme safety.
I don’t think we’re beyond repair yet but it feels much more like gaping fissures than surfacing cracks. Our infrastructure, education and healthcare is a disaster.
Well, the "congressional capture" problem makes that hard.
But even more, Boeing actually "should" want decent regulation because it gives them long term credibility. The problem others here have point out is that Boeing also wound-up "captured" by a finance/management regime that for twenty years has been gutting the company's long term prospects for short term profits - the ridiculous amalgam that is the 737 Max demonstrates this (it has paper manuals still, guess why?).
This case has Congress criticizing both Boeing and the FAA and of the two the FAA comes back with the crappiest response, trying to throw shade on the report. Congress is certainly not a collection of innocent choir boys, but here, given these responses, the FAA is the worst of the bad guys. Sorry if that fact frustrates, but that's how it is.
I'm convinced that people would generally not place success above morals when isolated. But a corporation isn't a person and without regulation and oversight it will do this every time. Some will transition faster than others. Some will find success in morals (Apple's privacy policy) - but in the end it's a means to success over just doing the right thing.
If you grip the control column, there's a switch toggle with 3 push-to-hold positions under your thumb. Nose up, off, nose down. It directly turns on the stabilizer trim motor, overriding any other signal.
When you put in trim with this switch, there is a wheel, about 18 inches across, right next to the pilot that starts to turn. As long as you give input, the wheel turns.
It is not quiet. It is a mechanical device.
Push trim for a 1/2 second, the wheel turns a bit.
Autopilot puts in trim, the wheel turns.
MCAS puts in trim, the wheel turns.
This is a very obvious and continuous source of information to the pilot that the stab trim is changing.
Technically it (used to) reset the timer until MCAS activation to 5 seconds after it is released. So you'd have to repeatedly engage to get your stabilizer to where you want it and cut the power. They removed the ability for the electric switches to actuate while the FC was isolated from the stabilizer motor controls as part of the MAX design. With NG's you could flip one cutout switch which would isolate the computer, while leaving on the yoke switches. In MAX, flipping either one apparently cuts out both the computer and the switches.
The pickle switch overrides the MCAS command, meaning it can be used to restore normal trim. Then, the trim system can be turned off via the console cutoff switches.
No MCAS is not active with autopilot, because it's not needed. MCAS is there in manual flight to give the human pilot a specific "feel" to the control column forces at high angles of attack. Autopilot doesn't need that.
This is what happens when you patch-up airframe stability issues with code. We have gone to the point of no return to save one last buck and only the MBA types are to blame for this.
More disgrace:
"The FAA is also accused of retaliating against whistleblowers, possibly obstructing the Office of the Inspector General’s investigation into the crashes"
I feel bad for the engineers and scientists that work at Boeing. I've worked with some of the brightest people in the aviation industry and I am sure they're internally facepalming at the actions of a few bad individuals.
...inside a system that very intentionally put N people in competition to cheat, thereby ensuring that cheating would happen, and in a manner that could plausibly be blamed on the person who happened to do the cheating rather than the system that knowingly ensured that the cheating would happen.
Have any Boeing engineers publicly left due to this? I remember tons of people leaving well known tech firms just for having Homeland Security / ICE as customers. I couldn't continue to work for a company that exhibited such deprave indifference to human safety.
> A continuation after the initial error is hard to explain other than by deliberate personal moral failure.
No, just denial: Look, it's a safe plane. We know it's a safe plane. Sure, it's not exactly like the earlier model, but those rules are needlessly strict. This plane is better, we know it's better. And pilots aren't idiots. They'll figure it out.
As we all learned, there's no single feature you can point to in the MAX that was a bad engineering decision in isolation. So if you don't want to see bad engineering, you don't have to.
Readit News
That just sounds like such a heartless, psychopathic thing to do. How could they not feel guilty, knowing that their actions could potentially lead to hundreds of people losing their lives?
can we drop this take now?
It's incorrect in the unsaid implication, that extreme scrutiny implies extreme safety.
Also boeing is on thin ice. They would not weather another incident like this.
So in this case, I think it does mean extreme safety.
https://greenwald.substack.com/p/instagram-is-using-false-fa...
https://greenwald.substack.com/p/after-the-deep-state-sabota...
https://greenwald.substack.com/p/article-on-joe-and-hunter-b...
But even more, Boeing actually "should" want decent regulation because it gives them long term credibility. The problem others here have point out is that Boeing also wound-up "captured" by a finance/management regime that for twenty years has been gutting the company's long term prospects for short term profits - the ridiculous amalgam that is the 737 Max demonstrates this (it has paper manuals still, guess why?).
Deleted Comment
What does the switch do? I have scanned a few articles about this by now, and none of them describe it's purpose or function. Does it turn off MCAS?
It's informally called a pickle switch.
A flaw in procedure that led to the initial catastrophes is at least understandable in terms of insidious errors in complex systems.
A continuation after the initial error is hard to explain other than by deliberate personal moral failure.
Deleted Comment
Perhaps that has some bearing on the problem?
No, just denial: Look, it's a safe plane. We know it's a safe plane. Sure, it's not exactly like the earlier model, but those rules are needlessly strict. This plane is better, we know it's better. And pilots aren't idiots. They'll figure it out.
As we all learned, there's no single feature you can point to in the MAX that was a bad engineering decision in isolation. So if you don't want to see bad engineering, you don't have to.