Listening to Jigar Shah, head of the DOE loans program, indicated part of the reason it's so expensive to build NPPs is that each nuclear power plant is a bespoke operation and requires a ton of custom work, planning and certification, etc. The suggestion he made was to create a basic design that you can just copy-paste where suitable, allowing you to leverage economics of scale. This would seem at least at first glance to align with the recommendations in the article.
France has sort of done this - they have 56 reactors in operation all based on the same 3 basic designs[1]. It's pretty incredible how quickly the plants were designed, tested, and built. Over a span of 15 years they brought 56 reactors online[2] - in the US we'd be lucky to build and commission a single reactor in that time span.
It was more like 30 years. '70-'85 was only the CP0-1-2 part, which was about 34 reactors. P and N models were built from '78 to 2000.
Also that doesn't include design. French design was done in the 60's, and resulted in UNGG prototypes which were abandoned in favor of buying a Westinghouse PWR license. All french reactors are based on that license.
Still an amazing feat, considering it's what provides power to France to this day.
Many claim that France’s 1974 Messmer plan resulted in the building of its 58 reactors in 15 years. This is not true. The planning for several of these nuclear reactors began long before. For example, the Fessenheim reactor obtained its construction permit in 1967 and was planned starting years before. In addition, 10 of the reactors were completed between 1991-2000. As such, the whole planning-to-operation time for these reactors was at least 32 years, not 15. That of any individual reactor was 10 to 19 years.
Lets add Flamanville 3 to the "experience" graph in the article. The only reason it gets pushed through is for France to have an industrial base enabling nuclear submarines, carriers and weapons.
Genuine question. What is the stopping the US from paying every experienced French Nuclear Engineer x 2 x Usual US cost Adjustment --> and letting them build here in the US ? France and US are allies, and likely aligned on climate goals. France has similar climate as many of the planned regions and has fairly high building standards.
> in the US we'd be lucky to build and commission a single reactor in that time span
Most countries, including the US and France, did a build out in the 70's/80's and then basically stopped. France a bit later than the US, but both essentially did the same thing. Checking the wiki list[0] and sorting by operation year you can see 4 things. 1) the vast majority of reactors were built in the 70's, 2) the newest reactor was built in the 90's (operational 2001), 3) the most recent reactors took longer to go into operation (including a few at 16 years, where the 70's build out was typically 6-7 years), 4) almost all 70s/80's reactors are of the same type and same power level (CP1, CP2, P4 REP 1300). We actually see the exact same story in the US (see Watts Bar, ouch).
On the other hand, South Korea didn't do their build out till the mid 80's and continued into the 90's. Then we see the wall hit in the 2000's with the APR 1400. Japan did a bit better and strangely looks like the big success story, especially considering how many reactors such a small country built. Interestingly only Mitsubishi reactors are still operational... Canada is also a good success story but also hasn't built anything since the late 80's (but last reactor was still <10yrs).
Countries like Sweden, started their build out but then there was a hard stop. Sweden had nothing past '85. Germany isn't too far off, but it is also a different story. Ditto for UK.
I intentionally left out China and Russia because different economic structures and because the stories are a bit different even though might appear similar to what I'm discussing at face value (note that my comments are vastly oversimplified, with some things only being alluded to), but it is worth paying attention to the above patterns and think about how the economic structure might reinforce some of those aspects, then think about the western countries different styles during their build out phases (how it actually worked).
The nuclear story is long and complicated. Even this wall of text is oversimplified. This is part of the problem: we like our simple talking points but as speakers are often unwilling to admit that these are only part of the stories or as listeners rebut the speaker as if they are only considering a single factor. It makes real conversation almost impossible and both play a role and build over time. Which is not too dissimilar to a few problems that happened in the nuclear industry.
The regulatory ratchet, headline fear and a complete refusal to consider having a $/QALY number is the reason for the insane costs. Nuclear power is the most over regulated industry in the world, with many safety measures giving returns of less than a single quality adjusted life year per billion dollars! (You can get this number simply by comparing the accident rate and QALY costs of 1970s reactors to modern ones)
Yeah, that's what TFA is about. People thought about it, but it turns out it doesn't matter, because regulatory requirements were a moving target and were applied retroactively to any project not yet finished.
This quote sums it up nicely:
> It doesn’t matter how standardized your design is if you end up needing to change it on every project to meet new requirements.
Yeah, but how can that happen in a changing regulatory environment? From the article it seems to me that even if you had built a plant and loved the design, it probably wouldn't be legal to build another one just like it a few years down the road. The author says that part of the reason for cost overruns is that the rules change even after construction has begun.
I worked in commercial nuclear operations for 23 years. It was a two unit site with unit one built first. It was designed as two identical units. By the time unit 2 was finished the regulations had changed so much that final reactor required operators to get a seperate license for each unit.
If DoE provided the regulations then they could update the template design as they update the regulations - if the build of the plant needed to change because of a change in regulations then they could account for that in the design.
The way to build standardized nuclear plants is for the reactor maker to build merchant plants, operate them, and sell the output into competitive power markets. It's like SpaceX building and operating their own vehicles, and how many renewable and natural gas power plants work.
It's just that no such merchant nuclear plant has ever been built anywhere. There's a serious lack of dog food here.
Of all of the things to entrust to the invisible hand of the private sector, I would put nuclear power generation dead fucking last on the list.
If you thought Bhopal and Exxon Valdez were bad, wait until some CEO decides to juice The Atomic Corporation's Q4 earnings by skipping a few safety inspections and half the Eastern seaboard no longer needs streetlights because everyone's tumors glow in the dark.
Most renewable, utility scale, operations are not run by the equipment OEMs, same as airlines aren't run by Boeing or Airbus. X-as-a-service works fine for software, but stops scaling well, or working at all, with hardware. Especially when capital isn't free anymore.
Getting the design certified and using that again is certainly a way of saving cost. Any regulator worth their salt would however still have to do the on the ground checks (e.g. if the right materials are used etc).
I think every HN user who programs knows that the process of copy-pasting comes with it's own danger. You are not automatically getting a working thing if the context you are pasting into differs ever so slightly.
If one plans to build a lot of nuclear plants that context might be something you can control. One of the things I would worry about is water and how to cool it.
Last summer most of France's nuclear power plants were switched off because the rivers they use for cooling were dried out. And the presidictions on the climate catastrophe have gotten worse.
In fact, there are a lot of standard designs. There's just not A standard design.
The issue is we build 1 or 2 plants at a time with a given design and by the time those plants are finished (10+ years) new regulations and new standards are in practice (see Gen II vs Gen III vs Gen III+ vs Gen IV reactors).
The good news is that Gen IV reactors, if approved, are much cheaper to build than Gen III/III+. The bad news is nobody wants to build them.
You mean maybe like a shipping container sized reactor that is simply stacked (and replaced / defueled for maintenance)?
Like one that can have its liquid fuel removed by just piping?
That's very development was done using a closet-sized reactor that could be easily powered up and powered down so it CAN scale with demand?
Whose design is inherently meltdown-proof?
Which uses almost all its fuel so there's no nuclear waste to transport?
That can breed its fuel from Thorium?
The time to invest in this was 20 years ago. Certainly the viability of nuclear missed the boat 10 years ago.
Nuclear will have to wait for solar/wind/battery and other grid levelling alternatives (home solar + storage, EVs-as-grid-batteries) to mature and develop before they have a stable economic target.
Then nuclear needs to figure out how to make that target. I think it is a LFTR, but who knows. I don't think solid fuel rods are the way. Too much waste, too much danger inherent to the fuel packaging.
And seriously, "the institute for progress"? The nuclear industry is so out of touch their marketing and lobbying is 30 years out of date.
That accounts for part of it, but there's a lot of litigation and environmental redtape that slows these things down. Before you can build a nuclear plant, you have to do an environmental impact report. Then somebody can complain, or sue, to stop over something in that environmental impact report. The ability of interest groups to halt nuclear, even green energy, is a bit ridiculous.
I have no problem with this personally. But I fear that nuclear fearmongers would capitalize on this as a possible "worst-case scenario" if we tried to deploy such a plan. Is this thought misguided?
Or perhaps the cost overruns are not accidents, but are the whole point. Nuclear power plants are a way to monetize the quirks of regulated monopolies. Get the plant approved and then shovel on the "oh gosh, who could have predicted this" cost increases. I mean, it's not like the people involved don't realize what's going to happen when they start building something that isn't even fully designed yet. As long the state regulators keep going along, each increase in capital cost is an increase in the earnings of the regulated utility. The perverse incentive is to balloon the costs as much as the regulators can bear. That the reactors are first of a kind is a feature, not a bug, since it lets that first foot-in-the-door lowballed estimate get approved.
My mother worked for a company that made small cooling fans used in fighter jets and space craft.
She would bring one of the fans home and say “Look! I just sold 10 of these for $1,000,000”
The fans themselves were cheap to manufacture. But they were SO incredibly important that they could NOT fail under any circumstance. (They were mostly fans meant to cool electronic systems, and if they failed, would cause the plane or space craft to explode, literally)
The fans were so expensive because they had to go through so many quality checks to ensure they would sustain every environment imaginable, compounded with the fact that there’s no scale in demand (no one other than Boeing, NASA, etc is going to buy a tiny $100k fan)
Tiny production volume + huge quality requirements/standards = very expensive product.
I assume a similar dynamic applies to many components in a nuclear power plant. Volume is very low and the quality/reliability requirements are very high.
Many years ago it was my job to design and procure control systems for natural gas power plants - this included mostly valves and instrumentation. Of course, once you're dealing with superheated steam (whether fired by natural gas, coal, angry isotopes, etc) it's all the same valves and thermocouples. So I got to know the product lines of the handful of suppliers very well. A few had nuclear product lines (USA only) which were identical in spec to everything else...with two major differences:
1) Everything had to be manufactured in the US with all the requisite paperwork
2) Every non-destructive test under the sun was required for every distinct part, including an encyclopedia's-worth of paperwork per test per part
In this case, it's not the parts, or even the design that breaks the bank. It's the validation.
It’s the opposite really - even if you have really safe parts, the overall system will be more likely to fail than any particular part.
Say you have 10 independent critical components each with a 0.99 probability of not failing. Well the probability of nothing failing in the system is 0.99^10 ≈ 0.9. So your collection of parts each with a 1% chance of failure has a 10% chance of some critical component failing overall.
Of course it’s more complicated because in real life nothing is really independent, and failure of one component will be coupled to failure in another. This makes simple solutions like redundancy not necessarily helpful (and sometimes even detrimental).
The problem is that any system that's built around cheap redundant parts will gradually degrade to it's minimum viable state because the humans who maintain it will eventually be lazy| greedy| stupid enough. So it also has to fail early by design before reaching that state.
There is in software, but in hardware it's a chain with links and the weakest part will be the one to cause the chain to fail. Hence the focus on individual parts reliability and quality.
You make me think about how nuclear weapons tests are currently done. they are detonated underground, the soil above the device collapses on top, containing the majority of the fallout. it's a reliable and simple system and poses the question, could a nuclear power station be built in that way, because it wouldn't require the development of new technology.
I have a tinfoil hat theory that all of this environmental and safety regulation was amplified heavily by lobbying and/or propaganda efforts from the coal companies. On one hand, you can make the argument that nuclear fuel was the new silent invisible killer on the block (as opposed to coal mining and emissions which were known, but accepted since it had been around for decades) But when I read stuff like this, it seems as if regulation was heavily disproportionately applied to nuclear energy even despite it being a new and unfamiliar danger. Or maybe the coal industry simply was more successful at curbing regulation. After all, it was was a more mature industry financially and politically.
My theory might be speculative and totally off the mark. But when you compare deaths per TWh of energy produced, coal is responsible for almost 3 orders of magnitude more deaths than nuclear. So maybe the real question is "how has coal power stayed so cheap?" or "if we tried to make coal power as safe as nuclear, what would it cost?"
Working with QA analysts has shown me that quality people are totally autonomous in adding disproportionate hurdles to the way of production without needing the help of any external lobbying.
It's very simple: the only way to 100% prevent an incident is the absence of production at all. If your incentive is to avoid incidents at all cost, you are incentivized to prevent production entirely.
Last year a tiny radioactive capsule the size of a fingernail went missing in Australia, when a "safe" storage container the size of a small car failed and allowed it to fall out.
The search to find the capsule cost four million dollars and there were global news stories warning people to avoid the highway the (very, very long) highway the truck had driven down.
In other countries (e.g. Soviet ones) where precautions like that haven't been taken, those capsules have been found after dozens of people caught cancer due to regular exposure to a capsule that just happened to end up near them. Presumably there are more that haven't been found, and those countries just accept a higher rate of cancer than the rest of the world.
The accidents you described didn't come from nuclear power plants. The Western Australian incident was mining equipment. The Goiânia accident happened in Brazil and was medical equipment. The Kramatorsk radiological accident was also mining equipment.
The Australia case is a clear example of misspent money because headlines rule the world.
Those millions of dollars could have saved a dozen lives, while odds are very high that capsule would have not been found by a civilian until after decaying to a harmless level. In the very unlikely event of being found it would likely have killed only one or two people.
Also, I wonder if the US has accumulated know-how to lower the cost of nuclear power plant construction. Korea has continued to build nuclear power plants, and it is clear that it has the know-how to cut costs.
Or just falsified certificates and used opaque accounting methods, all while the regulator sat on double chairs.
> In November 2012 it was discovered that over 5,000 small components used in five reactors at Yeonggwang Nuclear Power Plant had not been properly certified; eight suppliers had faked 60 warranties for the parts. Two reactors were shut down for component replacement, which was likely to cause power shortages in South Korea during the winter.[25] Reuters reported this as South Korea's worst nuclear crisis, highlighting a lack of transparency on nuclear safety and the dual roles of South Korea's nuclear regulators on supervision and promotion.[26] This incident followed the prosecution of five senior engineers for the coverup of a serious loss of power and cooling incident at Kori Nuclear Power Plant, which was subsequently graded at INES level 2.[25][27]
> In 2013, there was a scandal involving the use of counterfeit parts in nuclear plants and faked quality assurance certificates. In June 2013 Kori 2 and Shin Wolsong 1 were shut down, and Kori 1 and Shin Wolsong 2 ordered to remain offline, until safety-related control cabling with forged safety certificates is replaced.[28] Control cabling in the first APR-1400s under construction had to be replaced delaying construction by up to a year.[29] In October 2013 about 100 people were indicted for falsifying safety documents, including a former chief executive of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and a vice-president of Korea Electric Power Corporation.[30]
Same thing happened to a certain extent with French nuclear. This article talks vaguely about new requirements whilst large components were manufactured, but one of the big problems with Flamanville 3 was that one of the largest and most critical components - the main pressure vessel that formed the primary containment for radioactive materials - didn't meet the existing material specifications and was at increased risk of failing, and the manufacturer had basically faked the testing and certification on it. After discovering this, the regulators went back and looked at the reactor pressure vessels built by the same supplier during the golden era of French nuclear, and a bunch of them turned out to be defective in the same way.
The five European Pressurized Reactors (EPRs) designed by French utility EDF have all suffered unanticipated issues that have led to costly delays and soaring price
Findings of a 2020 Massachusetts Institute of Technology analysis that found successive iterations of a new nuclear design generally cost more than the original project
Although a pair of Chinese EPRs have been completed and are generating power, one unit was shut down for more than a year because of faulty fuel rods.
Costs and delays have also plagued EPRs in France, the United Kingdom, and Finland, where the completion of the Olkiluoto 3 reactor has been delayed 17 years
For more context: EPRs are all developed by EDF and Framatome. So this could be another factor explaining that they all have issues, rather than their sheer complexity.
You are missing half of it: Siemens. The EPR design is French-German, as an "evolutionary descendant of the Framatome N4 and Siemens Power Generation Division Konvoi reactors". [1]
This largely explain the complexity of the design: it would probably have been easier to make either an evolution of the Framatome N4 reactor, or the latest Siemens reactor. Combining both and trying to please all industrial partners (industrial work-share...) added a lot of complexity.
Hence the simpler EPR 2 design that is being worked on, presumably without Siemens Konvoi involvement in the design (although probably still as a subcontractor).
It sounds like we could fix basically all of this by having new plant approvals be "sticky", ie, once a project is approved, you can build and operate it with no additional regulatory-imposed changes.
This whole system of retroactively requiring changes made is absurdly costly and it's why we're stuck in terms of building out new capacity. This is not de-regulation, just changing how we regulate this from something that is actively antagonistic to something that is not.
Some level of retroactive regulatory changes are required because the industry keeps discovering that the previous way of doing things was substantially less safe than previously assumed.
My favorite example of this is that during the golden era of cheap nuclear power mentioned in articles like this, it was the norm to run all the redundant control and monitoring wiring through the same narrow duct in a wall meant to stop fire spreading, fill it with highly flammable foam, and test the foam for air leaks using a bare candle flame. The way we learned this was a bad idea was because workers at Brown's Ferry Nuclear Power Plant actually managed to start a fire and take out a bunch of supposedly redundant monitoring and control systems whilst flooding the control room with smoke. This bad design made both the redundancy and the firestops that were meant to be there ineffective, and the stricter fire regulations required to prevent issues like this are a major cost.
You can't just assume that because something hasn't caused a major catastrophe yet that it's safe to continue doing either. This is such bad engineering practice and has played a role in so many major disasters across multiple industries there's even a specific name for it: the normalization of deviance. It's dangerous because it invalidates all the engineering and safety calculations that were meant to prevent disaster, replacing them with a gamble where no-one really knows the odds.
It is perhaps sometimes true that it is "less safe than previously assumed", but I'd guess that more often it's "we figured out a way to do it _even safer_", but in either one of these cases, 40+ year old nuclear tech was and is safer than coal power plants, which is the alternative. We crossed "safer than the alternatives" and "safe enough" decades ago. The safety regime in the US around nuclear is out of control and has no connection with any outside context.
Given when Brown's Ferry was built (construction started in 1966), plus just how many million American engineers, construction workers, and service members had hard-won WWII-era experience with "if you do it that way, then it may burn up / sink / explode with just one hit" design principals - one has to wonder at the management of the Brown's Ferry design process. How did they manage to keep all of the real grown-ups out of the room?
When we find a systemic risk across the industry, like the requirement for independent core cooling after Fukushima, we should just roll with it and accept it?
Tsunamis do not happen everywhere, but the regulators found the risk to be systemic. As an example: A nuclear reactor in Sweden had a severe incident in 2006 when many of the "defense in depth" layers had been accidentally removed through freak occurrences and upgrades.
When your "safety" regulation is costing a billion dollars per QALY then by imposing it you are killing thousands of people, because that money could have instead been spend on other things like cancer screening that would let you save a thousand times as many lives per dollar.
> It sounds like we could fix basically all of this by having new plant approvals be "sticky", ie, once a project is approved, you can build and operate it with no additional regulatory-imposed changes.
Leaving aside Soviet-era propaganda and that contribution, this would lead to regular Chernobyl-style events if there was no requirement to implement reactively discovered safety processes.
According to the article, "rising labor costs are the bulk of increased construction costs". Yet we are talking about cost increasing by hundreds of percent. The question the article does not really pose is: how much of that labor is actually necessary?
I am reminded of my summer internship installing a computer system in a sewage plant. One of my jobs was testing the connection of the computer system to sensors. I needed a guide to show me where the sensors were located, and then I needed to attach a multimeter to the wires while someone on the computer end sent a signal. So two people needed.
However, there were six of us: The guide. The guy who could open the sensor cover. The guy who could attach the clips to the wires. The guy who read the meter. The guy who made sure each person only did his part of the job. And me. 300% of the required labor, so 300% of the costs.
When I think about big projects I immediately think about the system of contractors. There is a dozen layer distance between buyer and the guy who delivers. And every layer wants the share. So having one screw installed costs a salary for one guy and profit for dozen other involved companies creating price explosion.
This is why here in Finland most large construction projects have in their contract with the main supplier/builder a limit on how many layers of sub contractors is allowed. This is 2 or 3 for most projects.
This makes communication chains much shorter which usually leads into better end result. Also when things go wrong finding who is at fault is easier and it is more likely to be some big company that actually has money/proper insurance to be able to take care of it instead of some 2 or 3 person company that caused a multimillion fuckup and thus they would just go bankrupt instead of paying.
This is normal in any slightly larger project, the company that wins the bid rarely has hundreds of people twiddling their thumbs waiting for the next contract to be won. Instead the contracting company goes out to find sub contractors who do have free labor.
This creates a chain where the main contractor goes out to find labor, they find someone who promises fifty engineers for a good price. This company doesn’t either have fifty engineers sitting idle. Maybe they have ten. So they go out to find forty engineers. Rinse and repeat until the price that’s offered is too low for anyone to accept, or they’ve found their allocation of engineers.
The only way to prevent this is for the original contracting company to hire all of the necessary staff themselves onto their staff, but this is slow and only works if the project is long enough so that you can entice people to switch jobs. All experienced engineers are already employed somewhere else.
Readit News
[1] https://podcasts.apple.com/dk/podcast/jigar-shah-on-the-does...
[1] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/frances-efficiency-in-t... [2] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/read...
Also that doesn't include design. French design was done in the 60's, and resulted in UNGG prototypes which were abandoned in favor of buying a Westinghouse PWR license. All french reactors are based on that license.
Still an amazing feat, considering it's what provides power to France to this day.
https://imgur.com/6G2RBa0
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flamanville_Nuclear_Power_Plan...
We did 6 batches of 6-to-20 reactors.
Most countries, including the US and France, did a build out in the 70's/80's and then basically stopped. France a bit later than the US, but both essentially did the same thing. Checking the wiki list[0] and sorting by operation year you can see 4 things. 1) the vast majority of reactors were built in the 70's, 2) the newest reactor was built in the 90's (operational 2001), 3) the most recent reactors took longer to go into operation (including a few at 16 years, where the 70's build out was typically 6-7 years), 4) almost all 70s/80's reactors are of the same type and same power level (CP1, CP2, P4 REP 1300). We actually see the exact same story in the US (see Watts Bar, ouch).
On the other hand, South Korea didn't do their build out till the mid 80's and continued into the 90's. Then we see the wall hit in the 2000's with the APR 1400. Japan did a bit better and strangely looks like the big success story, especially considering how many reactors such a small country built. Interestingly only Mitsubishi reactors are still operational... Canada is also a good success story but also hasn't built anything since the late 80's (but last reactor was still <10yrs).
Countries like Sweden, started their build out but then there was a hard stop. Sweden had nothing past '85. Germany isn't too far off, but it is also a different story. Ditto for UK.
I intentionally left out China and Russia because different economic structures and because the stories are a bit different even though might appear similar to what I'm discussing at face value (note that my comments are vastly oversimplified, with some things only being alluded to), but it is worth paying attention to the above patterns and think about how the economic structure might reinforce some of those aspects, then think about the western countries different styles during their build out phases (how it actually worked).
The nuclear story is long and complicated. Even this wall of text is oversimplified. This is part of the problem: we like our simple talking points but as speakers are often unwilling to admit that these are only part of the stories or as listeners rebut the speaker as if they are only considering a single factor. It makes real conversation almost impossible and both play a role and build over time. Which is not too dissimilar to a few problems that happened in the nuclear industry.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_commercial_nuclear_rea...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price%E2%80%93Anderson_Nuclear...
Compare the $15 billion funded by the industry with Fukushima looking to cost at least $150 billion to clean up.
This quote sums it up nicely:
> It doesn’t matter how standardized your design is if you end up needing to change it on every project to meet new requirements.
It's just that no such merchant nuclear plant has ever been built anywhere. There's a serious lack of dog food here.
If you thought Bhopal and Exxon Valdez were bad, wait until some CEO decides to juice The Atomic Corporation's Q4 earnings by skipping a few safety inspections and half the Eastern seaboard no longer needs streetlights because everyone's tumors glow in the dark.
I think every HN user who programs knows that the process of copy-pasting comes with it's own danger. You are not automatically getting a working thing if the context you are pasting into differs ever so slightly.
If one plans to build a lot of nuclear plants that context might be something you can control. One of the things I would worry about is water and how to cool it.
Last summer most of France's nuclear power plants were switched off because the rivers they use for cooling were dried out. And the presidictions on the climate catastrophe have gotten worse.
The issue is we build 1 or 2 plants at a time with a given design and by the time those plants are finished (10+ years) new regulations and new standards are in practice (see Gen II vs Gen III vs Gen III+ vs Gen IV reactors).
The good news is that Gen IV reactors, if approved, are much cheaper to build than Gen III/III+. The bad news is nobody wants to build them.
Deleted Comment
Like one that can have its liquid fuel removed by just piping?
That's very development was done using a closet-sized reactor that could be easily powered up and powered down so it CAN scale with demand?
Whose design is inherently meltdown-proof?
Which uses almost all its fuel so there's no nuclear waste to transport?
That can breed its fuel from Thorium?
The time to invest in this was 20 years ago. Certainly the viability of nuclear missed the boat 10 years ago.
Nuclear will have to wait for solar/wind/battery and other grid levelling alternatives (home solar + storage, EVs-as-grid-batteries) to mature and develop before they have a stable economic target.
Then nuclear needs to figure out how to make that target. I think it is a LFTR, but who knows. I don't think solid fuel rods are the way. Too much waste, too much danger inherent to the fuel packaging.
And seriously, "the institute for progress"? The nuclear industry is so out of touch their marketing and lobbying is 30 years out of date.
Selling a basic design or a micro reactor means the industry would have to compete for the first time.
She would bring one of the fans home and say “Look! I just sold 10 of these for $1,000,000”
The fans themselves were cheap to manufacture. But they were SO incredibly important that they could NOT fail under any circumstance. (They were mostly fans meant to cool electronic systems, and if they failed, would cause the plane or space craft to explode, literally)
The fans were so expensive because they had to go through so many quality checks to ensure they would sustain every environment imaginable, compounded with the fact that there’s no scale in demand (no one other than Boeing, NASA, etc is going to buy a tiny $100k fan)
Tiny production volume + huge quality requirements/standards = very expensive product.
I assume a similar dynamic applies to many components in a nuclear power plant. Volume is very low and the quality/reliability requirements are very high.
1) Everything had to be manufactured in the US with all the requisite paperwork
2) Every non-destructive test under the sun was required for every distinct part, including an encyclopedia's-worth of paperwork per test per part
In this case, it's not the parts, or even the design that breaks the bank. It's the validation.
See also "certified" versus "experimental" general aviation aircraft.
Say you have 10 independent critical components each with a 0.99 probability of not failing. Well the probability of nothing failing in the system is 0.99^10 ≈ 0.9. So your collection of parts each with a 1% chance of failure has a 10% chance of some critical component failing overall.
Of course it’s more complicated because in real life nothing is really independent, and failure of one component will be coupled to failure in another. This makes simple solutions like redundancy not necessarily helpful (and sometimes even detrimental).
Deleted Comment
My theory might be speculative and totally off the mark. But when you compare deaths per TWh of energy produced, coal is responsible for almost 3 orders of magnitude more deaths than nuclear. So maybe the real question is "how has coal power stayed so cheap?" or "if we tried to make coal power as safe as nuclear, what would it cost?"
[0]https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2016/07/13/are-f...
https://www.ans.org/news/article-1392/robert-anderson-antinu...
https://thebreakthrough.org/blog/the-true-face-of-the-anti-n...
It's very simple: the only way to 100% prevent an incident is the absence of production at all. If your incentive is to avoid incidents at all cost, you are incentivized to prevent production entirely.
It is well documented
Dead Comment
The search to find the capsule cost four million dollars and there were global news stories warning people to avoid the highway the (very, very long) highway the truck had driven down.
In other countries (e.g. Soviet ones) where precautions like that haven't been taken, those capsules have been found after dozens of people caught cancer due to regular exposure to a capsule that just happened to end up near them. Presumably there are more that haven't been found, and those countries just accept a higher rate of cancer than the rest of the world.
Avoiding those scenarios is what costs so much.
> The capsule, part of a gauge used to measure the density of iron ore...
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/31/australian-nuclear-...
More info:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Australian_radioactive...
Terrifying Wikipedia rabbit hole:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_orphan_source_incident...
Those millions of dollars could have saved a dozen lives, while odds are very high that capsule would have not been found by a civilian until after decaying to a harmless level. In the very unlikely event of being found it would likely have killed only one or two people.
You would expect that if risk of radiation source loss underlies cost then they would be much more expensive.
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Also, I wonder if the US has accumulated know-how to lower the cost of nuclear power plant construction. Korea has continued to build nuclear power plants, and it is clear that it has the know-how to cut costs.
> In November 2012 it was discovered that over 5,000 small components used in five reactors at Yeonggwang Nuclear Power Plant had not been properly certified; eight suppliers had faked 60 warranties for the parts. Two reactors were shut down for component replacement, which was likely to cause power shortages in South Korea during the winter.[25] Reuters reported this as South Korea's worst nuclear crisis, highlighting a lack of transparency on nuclear safety and the dual roles of South Korea's nuclear regulators on supervision and promotion.[26] This incident followed the prosecution of five senior engineers for the coverup of a serious loss of power and cooling incident at Kori Nuclear Power Plant, which was subsequently graded at INES level 2.[25][27]
> In 2013, there was a scandal involving the use of counterfeit parts in nuclear plants and faked quality assurance certificates. In June 2013 Kori 2 and Shin Wolsong 1 were shut down, and Kori 1 and Shin Wolsong 2 ordered to remain offline, until safety-related control cabling with forged safety certificates is replaced.[28] Control cabling in the first APR-1400s under construction had to be replaced delaying construction by up to a year.[29] In October 2013 about 100 people were indicted for falsifying safety documents, including a former chief executive of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and a vice-president of Korea Electric Power Corporation.[30]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_South_Korea#H...
https://ieefa.org/articles/european-pressurized-reactors-nuc....
The cost overrun is a global problem.
The five European Pressurized Reactors (EPRs) designed by French utility EDF have all suffered unanticipated issues that have led to costly delays and soaring price
Findings of a 2020 Massachusetts Institute of Technology analysis that found successive iterations of a new nuclear design generally cost more than the original project
Although a pair of Chinese EPRs have been completed and are generating power, one unit was shut down for more than a year because of faulty fuel rods.
Costs and delays have also plagued EPRs in France, the United Kingdom, and Finland, where the completion of the Olkiluoto 3 reactor has been delayed 17 years
This largely explain the complexity of the design: it would probably have been easier to make either an evolution of the Framatome N4 reactor, or the latest Siemens reactor. Combining both and trying to please all industrial partners (industrial work-share...) added a lot of complexity.
Hence the simpler EPR 2 design that is being worked on, presumably without Siemens Konvoi involvement in the design (although probably still as a subcontractor).
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_(nuclear_reactor)
EDIT: clarity
> [...] the energy transition,” said Frank Bass, an IEEFA editor and author of the study. “Unfortunately, [...]
The site also seems to be a content farm, with the article rehashing the MIT study already posted here.
This whole system of retroactively requiring changes made is absurdly costly and it's why we're stuck in terms of building out new capacity. This is not de-regulation, just changing how we regulate this from something that is actively antagonistic to something that is not.
My favorite example of this is that during the golden era of cheap nuclear power mentioned in articles like this, it was the norm to run all the redundant control and monitoring wiring through the same narrow duct in a wall meant to stop fire spreading, fill it with highly flammable foam, and test the foam for air leaks using a bare candle flame. The way we learned this was a bad idea was because workers at Brown's Ferry Nuclear Power Plant actually managed to start a fire and take out a bunch of supposedly redundant monitoring and control systems whilst flooding the control room with smoke. This bad design made both the redundancy and the firestops that were meant to be there ineffective, and the stricter fire regulations required to prevent issues like this are a major cost.
You can't just assume that because something hasn't caused a major catastrophe yet that it's safe to continue doing either. This is such bad engineering practice and has played a role in so many major disasters across multiple industries there's even a specific name for it: the normalization of deviance. It's dangerous because it invalidates all the engineering and safety calculations that were meant to prevent disaster, replacing them with a gamble where no-one really knows the odds.
Tsunamis do not happen everywhere, but the regulators found the risk to be systemic. As an example: A nuclear reactor in Sweden had a severe incident in 2006 when many of the "defense in depth" layers had been accidentally removed through freak occurrences and upgrades.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forsmark_Nuclear_Power_Plant#J...
When your "safety" regulation is costing a billion dollars per QALY then by imposing it you are killing thousands of people, because that money could have instead been spend on other things like cancer screening that would let you save a thousand times as many lives per dollar.
Leaving aside Soviet-era propaganda and that contribution, this would lead to regular Chernobyl-style events if there was no requirement to implement reactively discovered safety processes.
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I am reminded of my summer internship installing a computer system in a sewage plant. One of my jobs was testing the connection of the computer system to sensors. I needed a guide to show me where the sensors were located, and then I needed to attach a multimeter to the wires while someone on the computer end sent a signal. So two people needed.
However, there were six of us: The guide. The guy who could open the sensor cover. The guy who could attach the clips to the wires. The guy who read the meter. The guy who made sure each person only did his part of the job. And me. 300% of the required labor, so 300% of the costs.
This makes communication chains much shorter which usually leads into better end result. Also when things go wrong finding who is at fault is easier and it is more likely to be some big company that actually has money/proper insurance to be able to take care of it instead of some 2 or 3 person company that caused a multimillion fuckup and thus they would just go bankrupt instead of paying.
This creates a chain where the main contractor goes out to find labor, they find someone who promises fifty engineers for a good price. This company doesn’t either have fifty engineers sitting idle. Maybe they have ten. So they go out to find forty engineers. Rinse and repeat until the price that’s offered is too low for anyone to accept, or they’ve found their allocation of engineers.
The only way to prevent this is for the original contracting company to hire all of the necessary staff themselves onto their staff, but this is slow and only works if the project is long enough so that you can entice people to switch jobs. All experienced engineers are already employed somewhere else.