A lot of businesses ask co-workers to share a room on trips. Business travel is a large share of reservations.
So they want to save a few bucks for which I am expected to trade not just my privacy but also my good night rest (who knows if one of us snores) against a few dollars of profit margin for my employer?
If they cannot afford sending me on a business trip they probably shouldn’t do so.
What kind of company are doing so?
And with X11 support gone we would have to downgrade to VNC to access our VMs?
It’s a blessing but when people are envious and agree that your gift is just arrogance from ignorance, then the blessing turns into a curse.
I can solve virtually any technical challenge that I am presented, given enough time (usually 1/10th the time needed by my colleagues) and yet I seem to get in trouble more times than others for the reasons above.
(For ref. I work in IT as probably most here, with an IQ of 135+, i.e. top-1%)
Apparently you have not solved the problems of how to find the right group and company yet. Either you are in the wrong room or just delusional.
PKI for everything else can go at their own pace
This proposal is to introduce PQ certificates in WebPKI such as for certificate authorities.
Problem is PQ signatures are large. If certificate chain is small that could be acceptable, but if the chain is large, then it can be expensive in terms of bandwidth and computation during TLS handshake. That is the exchange sends many certificates which embed a signature and a large (PQ) public key.
Merkle Tree Certificates ensures that an up to date client only needs 1 signature, 1 public key, 1 merkle tree witness.
Looking at an MTC generated certificate they've replaced the traditional signing algorithm and signature with a witness.
That means all a client needs is a signed merkle root which comes from an expanding Merkle Tree signed by the MTCA (Merkle Tree CA), which is delivered somehow out of band.
So basically TLS client receives certificate containing new signature algorithm which embeds a witness instead of a signature, a root (not sure if just a hash or a signed hash, I think the former). Client will get the signed roots out of band, which can be pre-verified, which means verifying the witness is simply doing a check on the witness.
Edit: My question: is this really a concern that needs to be addressed? PQ for TLS key exchange addresses a looming threat of HNDL (Harvest Now Decrypt Later). I don't see why we need to address making WebPKI use PQ signatures, at least for awhile now.