> Yes, I have a preference: Alice. Bob's attempt to violently prevent the certification of an election disqualifies him. Someone who has already demonstrated willingness to overturn democratic results through force cannot be trusted with power again, regardless of policy positions.
> Archive.is’s authoritative DNS servers return bad results to 1.1.1.1 when we query them. I’ve proposed we just fix it on our end but our team, quite rightly, said that too would violate the integrity of DNS and the privacy and security promises we made to our users when we launched the service.
> The archive.is owner has explained that he returns bad results to us because we don’t pass along the EDNS subnet information. This information leaks information about a requester’s IP and, in turn, sacrifices the privacy of users. This is especially problematic as we work to encrypt more DNS traffic since the request from Resolver to Authoritative DNS is typically unencrypted. We’re aware of real world examples where nationstate actors have monitored EDNS subnet information to track individuals, which was part of the motivation for the privacy and security policies of 1.1.1.1.
($1.25 input, $1.25 cache write, $0.13 cache read, and $10 output per million tokens)
* IRS audit into the PSF's 501c3 status
* if the PSF has received federal funds in the past, they'll probably be targeted by the DOJ's "Civil Rights Fraud Initiative"
* pressure on corporate sponsors, especially those that are federal contractors
> feat(shell): enable interactive commands with virtual terminal
* https://www.samsung.com/us/xr/galaxy-xr/galaxy-xr/
* https://www.samsung.com/us/business/xr/galaxy-xr/galaxy-xr/
Anthropic: "$2.66 billion on compute on an estimated $2.55 billion in revenue"
Cursor: "bills more than doubled from $6.2 million in May 2025 to $12.6 million in June 2025"
Clickthrough if you want the analysis and caveats
> In the system card, we focus on safety evaluations, including assessments of: ... the model’s own potential welfare ...
In what way does a language model need to have its own welfare protected? Does this generation of models have persistent "feelings"?> We remain highly uncertain about the potential moral status of Claude and other LLMs, now or in the future. However, we take the issue seriously, and alongside our research program we’re working to identify and implement low-cost interventions to mitigate risks to model welfare, in case such welfare is possible. Allowing models to end or exit potentially distressing interactions is one such intervention.
In pre-deployment testing of Claude Opus 4, we included a preliminary model welfare assessment. As part of that assessment, we investigated Claude’s self-reported and behavioral preferences, and found a robust and consistent aversion to harm. This included, for example, requests from users for sexual content involving minors and attempts to solicit information that would enable large-scale violence or acts of terror. Claude Opus 4 showed:
* A strong preference against engaging with harmful tasks;
* A pattern of apparent distress when engaging with real-world users seeking harmful content; and
* A tendency to end harmful conversations when given the ability to do so in simulated user interactions.
These behaviors primarily arose in cases where users persisted with harmful requests and/or abuse despite Claude repeatedly refusing to comply and attempting to productively redirect the interactions.