I run mine on the public internet and it’s fine, because I put it behind auth, because it’s a tool to remotely execute code with no auth and also has a fully featured webshell.
To be clear, this is a vulnerability. Just the same as exposing unauthenticated telnet is a vulnerability. User education is always good, but at some point in the process of continuing to build user-friendly footguns we need to start blaming the users. “It is what it is”, Duh.
This “vulnerability” has been known by devs in my circle for a while, it’s literally the very first intuitive question most devs ask themselves when using opencode, and then put authentication on top.
Particularly in the AI space it’s going to be more and more common to see users punching above their weight with deployments. Let em learn. Let em grow. We’ll see this pain multiply in the future if these lessons aren’t learned early.
Can you share what made this behavior obvious to you? E.g. when I first saw Open Code, it looked like yet another implementation of Claude Code, Codex-CLI, Gemini-CLI, Project Goose, etc. - all these are TUI apps for agentic coding. However, from these, only Open Code automatically started an unauthenticated web server when I simply started the TUI, so this came as a surprise to me.
True I did assume machines are single user, I haven't seen a shared computer in ages. Doing local development I have insecure/incomplete software listening on localhost all the time while developing it. And lots of people have passwordless sudo, or unprivileged access to the docker socket so protection against local processes running as me is not part of my threat model. And I know this is pretty dev centric but OpenCode is dev centric as well.