Edit: They are using 0-Day exploits against mobile clients that take advantage of flaws in default applications like iMessage. Pegasus intrusions have been detected on devices as new as the iPhone 12 running iOS 14.6. This would be a severity rating 10/10 for a CVE, to put it into perspective.
I'm all for re-using code when rebuilding the wheel would be a hassle but it has to be balanced with proper code review before it should be included. Developers are much too quick to include outside code with the assumption that other people have already done the necessary reviews and this is where a lot of devs are getting bit.
There are 63 Js, 14 As, but 165 Ls.
A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET J.ROOT-SERVERS.NET
That means Verisign controls 15% of the global roots while everyone else holds a meager 7%. IANA got the optics on this one all sorts of messed up.
As a small structure you can achieve that but at a very large scale, this is effectively the sign that natural competition is not working as expected.
The Registrars like Namecheap and friends are just the messengers authorized to register .com domains into this larger database and they pay Verisign for the privilege to do so.
While it's possible for anyone to go out and stand up their own .COM zone in DNS, any domains created by that registrar don't actually exist in the eyes of the larger Internet and will not work.
And it's not just decentralizing trust, but also further centralizing it: Instead of a list of CAs you can trust/not trust, you tie everything back to the DNSSEC root keys and your TLDs master keys.
My idea for letting the trust being tied to the Root and TLD master keys was more in spirit of allowing people to have more say in SSL. The Internet is technically centralized to the IP and DNS namespace already so for me it seemed like the next step in the chain. While we centralize one part of the Internet we also open it up to allow for alternative root projects like OpenNIC to be able to establish community-based chains of trust.
Like I know one of the big problems with OpenNIC is nobody can really use SSL since if you trust a third party CA they can just sign for anybody without limits, and if you run both a DNS and CA service there then you have everything you would need to do large scale SSL interception in those cases :(