Thats not exactly true since this requires the application to have permission to talk to the secrets service (if using Flatpak)
[1]: https://flatkill.org/ [2]: https://hanako.codeberg.page/
Thats not exactly true since this requires the application to have permission to talk to the secrets service (if using Flatpak)
[1]: https://flatkill.org/ [2]: https://hanako.codeberg.page/
For example, the kernel could be used[1] to store the secrets in memory and only authorize the userspace process that created it to read it; other processes could request access to a secret and only be given if you accept.
At the same time a malware can just get all of your passwords without even asking using d-bus or read all of your files since it's running as your uid.
It is striking that we don't see that. We reliably see people saying "obviously" the Mossad or the NSA are snooping but they haven't shown any evidence that there's tampering
It probably just means they are asking the providers to hand over the data, no need to perform active attacks.
It's dark comedy because the progress of fusion just feels so agonizingly slow, that even a very optimistic prediction for 10 years from now sounds like such small and functionally useless progress.
And there's no shade toward any of the entities involved, it's a hard problem, but it's still funny.
ITER achieves net positive energy for 20 consecutive minutes
That's just pure dark comedy, although maybe kinda accurate? What would humans predict for this?
The most recent timeline I know (from 2024) in fact puts the start of the DT operation at 2035, so I doubt ITER would achieve such a huge result within less than an year.
We start with detached electrons moving at high speeds (plasma). We want detached electrons moving at moderate speeds (electrical current). And yet, the intermediate steps involve everything from heat, steam, large-scale mechanical forces and magnetic induction, just to get back to the electrons?
It feels more like the "pull in a 500MB framework instead of writing the function yourself" kind of simplicity.
Essentially yes, but it's a function that has been continuously optimised by engineers for 200 years.
No security boundary can prevent bad permissions just like in android.
They both create an illusion of safety. We all know that X.org had no security model and it sucks. Wayland put restrictions that would make sense if the rest of the desktop ecosystem was made with security in mind, but it wasn't. I've heard way too many claims like "Wayland makes keyloggers impossible" that are technically true but irrelevant in the real world, because a desktop environment is not just Wayland.
Flatpack is also misleading and its sanboxing is just not great, regardless of the problem with X11.
> No security boundary can prevent bad permissions just like in android.
Good bringing this up: in Android the applications ask the user for permissions, in flatpak permissions are granted based on what the developed asked. That's just bad.