I first saw it shared on HN and I've been a happy customer for the past year and the ability to compare the impact of different scenarios has helped me make a few big financial decisions. Good community around it for asking questions too.
Far too much of my own money has been squandered on living in the now, and tools like this help give me the tools to grasp what it really means to tweak the balance of spending and saving when viewed over the long run.
Frontier is labeled as a fiber provider for my address on the New York State PSC Broadband map and I made sure to provide some feedback to them about that claim.
Would love to have even just a single alternative option besides satellite internet. I'm only 10 miles outside of the downtown area.
With enough evidence, operators are compelled to provide data and are given an opportunity to correct their action. If they refuse, FCC will eventually issue an order to all other providers to not accept calls from the bad actor.
I'm not convinced that STIR/SHAKEN even works properly. Recently, I migrated a DID from one VOIP provider to another. I set the outbound caller ID on the new provider, and it was showing up Verified with a checkmark to mobile devices before I had even submitted the port request to the old provider.
As long as they managed to attach the identity header to the sip invite correctly, and are not considered to be a shady actor - downstream providers such as carriers probably have no reason to label it as spam. Spam labeling is typically done via analytics, outsourced to third parties like First Orion.
Attest levels are not in themselves proper tools for spam detection. The real meat of stir shaken is the origid in the identity JWT claim which is an opaque identifier that can be traced back to a particular user/customer/network equipment.
STIR/SHAKEN being sold as the one and only solution for spam calls was a mistake as it is only one iteration in the right direction. You have a handful of RFCs and ATIS specs that the FCC told operators to implement in a phased approach, and ultimately some gaps were uncovered in practice that reduced its effectiveness.
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So the public phone system now supports it, but the problem is that not all providers support it yet, which fundamentally weakens the system. Of course, you can’t just add a new “protocol version” to an over-100 year old phone system with zero time to do a migration.*
But now that it’s been a few years, we are reaching a point where, at least for the US, the FCC wants to ban any provider who hasn’t added support.
*simplification
End to end authenticated calls is the ideal state, but I don't think we're fully there yet.