So I think a monthly subscription is the business model, not ads.
You control who can decrypt your data
Your employer, we as software providers, and the government cannot decrypt your data without your permission, even with a subpoena to do so.
Your data is anonymized
There is an initial mapping from your application request to an anonymous ID, but after that, even we don't know whose encrypted data is whose.
Your data will never be sold
Not only do we pledge never to sell your data, but we couldn't even if we wanted to because we can't decrypt it without your permission.
Envelope encryption with unique secret keys
Data keys are used to encrypt your data and are themselves encrypted under a secret key. No one, including us, can export the secret keys.
Tamperproof hardware
Decrypted data is only ever stored in memory (source: <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details...>), which is protected from tampering by a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic appliance (source: <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validati...>).
Protected from 3rd party AI providers
Data sent to 3rd party AI providers for transcription and summarization is anonymized, not used for training, and deleted after 30 days.
Protected from cloud provider and subpoena
AWS KMS (source: <https://aws.amazon.com/kms/>) uses FIPS 140-2 (source: <https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-modu...>) validated hardware security modules (HSMs) to ensure no one, including AWS employees, can retrieve your plaintext KMS keys.
E2EE suggests that only the user (or at least only people the user knows about in the case of e.g. group chats) is able to see/access the decrypted data, which is false. Limitless does not decrypt data on the client using a key only the user has access to, it decrypts the data on the server (in this case using AWS KMS) and sends it to the client. Even if we remove just decrypting everyone’s data out of the equation using AWS KMS (since the user does not control the key), you could trivially write a Cloudflare Worker (since you use Cloudflare on your API subdomain) that simply sends the (unencrypted) API response along with the email from the Supabase JWT used in the header to a server that accumulates everyone’s recording names, transcripts, generated notes and generated summaries. If someone gained access to your Cloudflare account they could also do this. You’re advertising Limitless as if you aren’t able to see people’s transcripts even if you wanted to, which is false. Even your employer can if they TLS MitM you with their own TLS certificates, which is not rare. On the other hand, Signal cannot see your data unless they modify client code, nor can your employer unless they install a modified Signal client on your device or install spyware on your device, which is reading decrypted data from memory. This is what separates encrypting at rest and E2EE (which you say your solution is just as secure as and is better than) for the end user and it feels like false advertising. Limitless, your employer and a potential hacker can all read your data, at the minimum while you’re using Limitless.
[1]: https://help.limitless.ai/en/articles/9130680-privacy-with-l...
Edit: I just tried it. They don't give you encryption keys you need to enter when signing in and the server literally sends you your transcripts with no encryption. Maybe they're including a key somehow derived when signing in with Google/a magic link in the request, but I don't think anything would stop them from just logging API responses even if that was the case. They're definitely not using E2EE. They might just be encrypting at rest and storing their keys in AWS KMS which sounds like false advertising.