I think library/runtime makers aren't saying "let's make an official/blessed take on this thing that a large number of users are doing" as much as they should.
Popular libraries for a given runtime/language should be funded/bought/cloned by the runtime makers (e.g. MS for .NET, IBM/Oracle for Java) more than they are now.
I know someone will inevitably mention concerns about monopolies/anti-trust/"stifling innovation" but I don't really care. Sometimes you have to standardize some things to unlock new opportunities.
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-c...
"We’ve heard concerns from some smaller services that the new rules will be too burdensome for them. Some of them believe they don’t have the resources to dedicate to assessing risk on their platforms, and to making sure they have measures in place to help them comply with the rules. As a result, some smaller services feel they might need to shut down completely.
So, we wanted to reassure those smaller services that this is unlikely to be the case."
Deleted Comment
I can't seem to find any information about that anywhere.
2. yeah, I'd love that too - we're keen to integrate with everything else that people are using. We have a basic in-house IdP thing for our own staff to authenticate against our hosted services, but haven't scaled it out. This will happen eventually, though I've been burned enough times I don't want to promise a timeframe.
I'd start with that and see how it seemed to work when trying to look through backups and test-restore things.
The time-variant component is still quite valuable, but it does nothing to protect you in the event of a password manager compromise. This is not a hypothetical; LastPass has suffered multiple breaches, and the more popular a solution, the more likely there are to be attacks against that solution. By keeping your 2FA separate from your password manager, even if it's still just "something you know", it's something you know in a location that's orthogonal to your passwords. If I yield to convenience and use a 2FA desktop app, then now, instead of just attacking my Bitwarden install, you have to successfully attack my Bitwarden install and my 2FA desktop app install to get access to my accounts, and the combination of password managers * 2FA managers is a substantially larger attack surface and requires a significantly more sophisticated attack to get both pieces.
The arguments in the article come down to "well, 2FA mitigates phishing attacks" (true) and "Google Authenticator means you can lose your data easily" (also true). But neither of these is a good argument for why the data should be kept together. It just means "use 2FA", and "use a 2FA manager that lets you directly manage your seeds and keep offsite encrypted backups".
If you can't be bothered to do it properly, then 2FA codes in your password manager is certainly better than not using 2FA at all, but that just makes it a less terrible solution, not a good one.
You can mitigate this risk by not depending on your password manager app to do cross-device sync..keep a file on Dropbox/OneDrive/iCloud Drive/SFTP/etc and use an app like KeePass/Strongbox/etc that just deals in managing credentials.
My KeePass file storage provider doesn't know what the hell I store there because it's encrypted (I hope there are no known issues with KeePass's crypto)
As a bonus, you can keep offline backups to mitigate other risks like house fire, lightning strike induced EMP frying things (happened to me), storage vendor goes out of business, and more.
-------------
I think in the end, there is no universal solution - you really have to try to be reasonable about estimating your own personal threats and risks (such as asking "am I more likely to suffer a password manager compromise or more likely to break a device?") to decide whether to keep 2FA next to passwords or not.
The only things I wish FM had are all software:
1. A takeout-style API to let me grab a complete snapshot once a week with one call
2. The ability to be an IdP for Tailscale.