#notAllPlural's

My work demands that I generate large amounts of data and I don’t know how much I’ll have to generate up-front. So I run out of disk space a lot.

My experience is that Windows and many of its programs will become very unstable with 0 b on the system drive. And about 3 times out of maybe 50, the system also became unbootable. I’ve learned to do whatever I can to free up space before restarting for stability.

The last time I’d regularly run out of space on Win was around Windows 98 times. I never had a problem then. Now in Windows 11 times, it’s a real headache.

Not sure how you’re so lucky.

apparently they attribute the loss to deciding not to purchase EUV earlier from ASML. did they really think they knew better than company that's defining SOTA?

For many projects, the release tarballs only contain the files necessary to build the software, and not the following items that may be present in the same repository:

- scripts used by project developers to import translations from another system and commit those translation changes to the repository

- scripts to build release tarballs and sign them

- continuous integration scripts

- configuration and scripts used to setup a developer IDE environment

About four years ago Andreesen published this: https://a16z.com/its-time-to-build/

They were and remain big crypto investors and it's pretty weird that the essay doesn't acknowledge how much talent and money crypto sucked up. He asks where the supersonic aircraft are and - ignoring that they have awful externalities - there is actually a supersonic jet startup. A16Z hasn't invested in Boom, though, near as I can tell.

A16Z is a leading venture fund - if anyone's gonna build the future, they could use A16Z's money. So why is so much of what Andreesen wants from the future not what they've invested in?

1.5.29-rc2 was tagged on 9 Nov 2023 [1] and, as an example, did not contain "N_("CJK Unified Ideographs Extension I")," in src/ibusunicodegen.h [2].

Commit 228f0a77b2047ade54e132bab69c0c03f0f41aae from 28 Feb 2023 introduced this change instead. It's the same person who tagged 1.5.29-rc2 and committed 228f0a77b2047ade54e132bab69c0c03f0f41aae which is typically an indication the maintainer tar'd their checked out git folder and accidentally included changes not get committed.

The question raised is whether anyone is auditing these differences before the checksummed tarballs are added to package repositories.

[1] https://github.com/ibus/ibus/releases/tag/1.5.29-rc2

[2] https://github.com/ibus/ibus/blob/0ad8e77bd36545974ad8acd0a5...

[3] https://github.com/ibus/ibus/commit/228f0a77b2047ade54e132ba...

My (probably ignorant) thinking was that if there weren't propellers, just stalks, they could be arranged in a pattern that radar setups at multiple locations could see through gaps and between them have no dark spaces caused by the towers. Leaving the problem that the blades essentially block out an entire circle, but if the radar software knows the position of every turbine's blades (by a combination of turbines reporting location/speed/acceleration of blades in real time and maybe modelling so the radar system can know in time at least fairly if not very accurately where all blades are in a field of them) then when a radar bounces of one it can say "that doesn't count as a hit" leaving only non-turbine objects showing up in the UI that the radar setup outputs?

Is it that radar can't ping / receive at a high enough frequency to distinguish the difference between "this fraction of a ms the blade was at that location so we don't care about the radar hitting something, but the next fraction of a ms the blade had moved and we still got a ping from just behind it so there's something there"? Or some other problem with the idea?

As I understand it Ed448 was only recently added to openssh, so maybe it was chosen in order to evade detection by analysis tools that scan for keys (if such a thing is possible.)

Any log that root on that box has write access to. It’s theoretically possible to have an anomaly detection service running on a vulnerable machine dumping all of its’ data to an append-only service on some other non-compromised box. In that case, (in this ideal world) the attacker would not be able to disable the detection service before it had logged the anomalous traffic, and wouldn’t be able to purge those logs since they were on another machine.

I’m not aware of any services that a) work like this, or b) would be able to detect this class of attack earlier than last week. If someone does though, please share.