"I don't understand most of the technical details of Apple's blog post"

I do:

- Client side vectorization: the photo is processed locally, preparing a non-reversible vector representation before sending (think semantic hash).

- Differential privacy: a decent amount of noise is added the the vector before sending it. Enough to make it impossible to reverse lookup the vector. The noise level here is ε = 0.8, which is quite good privacy.

- OHTTP relay: it's sent through a 3rd party so Apple never knows your IP address. The contents are encrypted so the 3rd party never doesn't learn anything either (some risk of exposing "IP X is an apple photos user", but nothing about the content of the library).

- Homomorphic encryption: The lookup work is performed on server with encrypted data. Apple can't decrypt the vector contents, or response contents. Only the client can decrypt the result of the lookup.

This is what a good privacy story looks like. Multiple levels of privacy security, when any one of the latter 3 should be enough alone to protect privacy.

"It ought to be up to the individual user to decide their own tolerance for the risk of privacy violations." -> The author themselves looks to be an Apple security researcher, and are saying they can't make an informed choice here.

I'm not sure what the right call is here. But the conclusion "Thus, the only way to guarantee computing privacy is to not send data off the device." isn't true. There are other tools to provide privacy (DP, homomorphic encryption), while also using services. They are immensely complicated, and user's can't realistically evaluate risk. But if you want features that require larger-than-disk datasets, or frequently changing content, you need tools like this.