Sequence of events:
tccd preflights access to Reminders (TCC-protected) with no app context
abm-helper, CommCenterRootHelper, and cfprefsd coordinate via Mach/XPC
sosd attempts to write to a sensitive communications safety plist
nsurlsessiond purges its cache
symptomsd logs 5MB+ of RX/TX traffic — with no app running
There is:
No telemetry toggle
No EDR/MDM visibility
No disclosure from Apple
This breaks the app-based sandbox and represents:
A system-native stealth exfil pipeline
Cross-daemon privilege chaining
A real privacy and compliance blind spot
Real question is, can other iOS applications trigger this data leaking behavior or can untrusted MacOS devices do this as well?
The fact that internal system daemons can silently trigger access to TCC-protected domains (like Contacts, FaceID, Microphone, and Bluetooth) without app association or user consent breaks Apple’s own stated privacy model.
System daemons silently initiate Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) scans without app activity or user interaction.
GPS location harvesting occurs with no prompts, indicators, or active apps.
Internal frameworks bypass Apple’s Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) protections using undocumented flags.
Bluetooth trust metadata (e.g., IRKs, pairing history) is exposed even when devices are disconnected.
Cryptographic failures are silently ignored during trust operations.
These behaviors suggest an integrated telemetry pipeline that operates beneath iOS’s user-facing privacy model. The full report includes logs, technical breakdowns, and reproduction steps.
This violates Apple’s hardware trust model and exposes internal diagnostics meant for development silicon.