I'm a big fan of conventional commits, and trailers seem like a better way of adding such metadata.
Is adding them manually to the commit message functionally equivalent to using the `--trailer` flag?
Yes. The flag is perfect for scripts but it's exactly equivalent to adding the text manually.
If you use `assert` in tests, I don't understand why you wouldn't also prefer unwrap in this context.
I think it's also perfectly reasonable to use in a context like binary you run locally for private consumption, or for instance a serverless function which allows you to pinpoint the source of errors more easily in the logs.
It's not a good fit for cases where you do expect cases where the unwrap will fail, but it's a great fit for cases where you believe the unwrap should always succeed, as it allows you to pinpoint the cases where it fails.
Take a closer look at testresult since it also points directly at the exact line of failure (due to panics being used under hood) but looks nicer.
send friend@rebol.com read http://www.cnn.com
`read` knows that it takes one argument, and `send` knows that it takes two, so this ends up being grouped like (send friend@rebol.com (read http://www.cnn.com))
(which I think is valid syntax; that AST node is called a 'paren').Weirdly, the language also has some infix operators, which seem a bit out-of-place to me. I have no idea how the 'parser'[1] works.
[1] 'parsing' happens so late that it feels funny to call it that. The thing that knows how to treat an array as a representation of an evaluatable expression and evaluate it.
I think parsing there depends on the actual value of the current token. So if you assign send to another variable and use that the "parser" will still recognize that it takes 2 parameters.
It's an interesting design, definitely not something one sees frequently.
I've come to the conclusion that even in tests unwraps look ugly. Especially in doc tests which serve as examples the code is better off using regular "?" that one would see in other parts of code. (that is: don't treat test code as a "worse" kind of code)
In Signstar we're using testresult which still panics under the hood (which is OK for tests) https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/signstar/-/blob/main/... but the rendered example looks a lot better: https://docs.rs/nethsm/latest/nethsm/enum.OpenPgpVersion.htm...
Note that I'm currently maintaining that crate but the design is described at https://www.bluxte.net/musings/2023/01/08/improving_failure_...
Honestly I'd like to see Windows 11 running under this as well, but that seems incredibly unlikely.
1. Any fines for not complying would be less than what they would lose by complying
2. That no individual would suffer any consequences for blatantly disobeying a court order.
In my opinion, the whole concept that a company can break the law but no human can be held responsible is insane.
I really hope that criminal charges are brought against those involved in making a conscious choice to both lie to the court and ignore the court order. Hopefully that will make other executives think twice when put in the same situation.
Wait, isn't the board personally liable for their decisions? I'm not a lawyer, obviously.
However, if Let‘s encrypt were to support S/MIME certificates, it would have a far greater impact. Since a few years, we have an almost comical situation with email encryption: Finally, most important mail user agents (aka mail clients) support S/MIME encryption out of the box. But you need a certificate from a CA to have a smooth user experience, just like with the web. However, all CAs that offer free trustworthy¹ S/MIME certificates with a duration of a year or more² have disappeared. The result: No private entities are using email encryption.
(PGP remains unused outside of geek circles because it is too awkward to use.)
Let‘s encrypt our emails!
¹ A certificate isn‘t trustworthy if the CA generates the secret key for you.
² With S/MIME you need to keep your old certificates around to decrypt old mails, so having a new one frequently is not practical
You don't need to change your decryption key - the new certificate can use the same decryption keys as the old one (certbot even has a flag: --reuse-key). Whether this is a good idea or not is a separate question.
I think the biggest benefit would be ACME-like automatic certificate issuance. Currently getting a new certificate is just too much friction.