>Either he is here to scare Musk, or - more likely IMO - to act as a Musk lightning rod. Musk takeover part 2?
>Either he is here to scare Musk, or - more likely IMO - to act as a Musk lightning rod. Musk takeover part 2?
I'm sure Quora views took a hit after ChatGPT. Not like Quora was any good before ChatGPT, they just managed to get to the top of Google results for a lot of common questions.
Now, Poe by Quora was trying to go big on custom agents. The GPT Agents announcement on DevDay was a fundamental threat to Poe in many ways.
I'm convinced that Adam D'Angelo probably had some influence on the other two board members too. He should've left the board of OpenAI the moment OpenAI and his own company were competing in the same space.
Also keep in mind that a year earlier in Spring 2017 Sam Altman led Quora's Series D, after YC previously joined in on Quora's Series C in 2014. So the two of them clearly had some pre-existing relationship.
I don't think OpenAI and Quora (the product) are a serious conflict of interest. You claim "I'm sure Quora views took a hit after ChatGPT" but I really doubt that's true in any meaningful way. Quora's struggles are a separate issue and predate the GPT craze of the last year.
Nor were Poe and OpenAI competitors until recently; Poe was simply building on top of OpenAI models, the same as hundreds of other ventures in the space right now.
However...I do agree that the GPTs announcement two weeks ago now creates a very clear conflict of interest--OpenAI is now competing directly against Poe. And because of that, I agree that Adam probably should leave the board.
The timing also raises the question of whether booting Sam is in any way related to the GPTs launch and to Poe. Perhaps Sam wasn't candid about the fact that they were about to be competing with Adam's company. The whole thing is messy and not a good look and exactly why you try to avoid these conflicts of interest to begin with.
The simple fact is that doing any kind of mindsport intensely over an extended period is very draining.
[1] https://twitter.com/asmelashteka/status/1630966233217605632
If I were teaching poker in a university setting I would generally work with a bunch of toy games to teach concepts of polarization, MDF, indifference, and so on. Those are the fundamentals of poker theory in the modern environment.
I'll give you a concrete example. In lecture five at 15m he starts talking about donk betting, which is when you lead out with a bet on a street into the aggressor from the previous street instead of checking to them to let them bet (for example, you're the big blind, you call a raise from the button preflop, and then when the flop comes you bet directly yourself instead of checking). He mentions that this is unusual, which is true, because normally you would just check and let the person with the betting lead bet into you if you have a good hand, and so the donk bet is typically weak--but then he goes on to say that advanced players may exploit this perception by donk betting with a strong hand knowing you will interpret it as weak, and then you can exploit that line of thinking, etc.
A more modern view of donk betting is this: the "betting lead" is not anything inherent to the game but just an artifact of the range of hands each person has. Typically when you call preflop from the big blind, you'll have a wider range of hands than the person raising preflop, because they can't raise too wide profitably due to players left to act after them, and you get to both close the action & also get better pot odds on your call from the big blind. Not only do you have a wider range of hands, then, but you also lack the strongest hands (AA, KK etc) because you would have reraised (3bet) them preflop. So overall, on most flops, the preflop raiser will have a stronger range of hands and can thus be expected to "take the lead" betting.
But! There are some flops that can neutralize or even reverse this range advantage. The flop 654 rainbow is now better for the big blind than for an early position (EP) raiser, because the big blind will have many straights, sets, two pairs, and pair+draw hands in their range, while the EP player will generally not have these hands. The EP's big pairs (AA, KK etc) are less strong, and some of their other strong hands preflop like AK or AQs have totally whiffed too.
As a consequence, it is correct for the big blind to have a donk betting strategy in this situation--the way the two ranges interact, the big blind is now incentivized to put money into the pot directly, and in fact, if the big blind does not have a donk betting strategy on this flop, the EP player should respond by virtually never betting themselves. The big blind is incentivized to bet frequently with a small sizing and put pressure on EP's overcards; if you have, say, 86s, and you can get a hand like QJo to fold, that's a pretty decent result on the flop, because QJo has six outs to improve to a better pair.
Anyway, sorry that this example was probably hard to follow if you don't play poker, but it's probably illustrative of some of the ways in which poker theory has evolved over the years--more focus on the specifics of range vs range interactions. There are many more complicated and intricate examples on turns and rivers that solvers are very good at finding but may or may not be obvious to humans.
source: semi-professional online cash game player