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emarsden commented on Drift towards danger and the normalization of deviance (2017)   risk-engineering.org/conc... · Posted by u/rzk
rob74 · a year ago
Yeah, the article is from 2017, otherwise they could have added the 737 MAX story as another perfect example...
emarsden · a year ago
This is debatable. Perhaps the poor quality management issues and lack of rigour that have been seen in various Boeing production facilities are a case of normalization of deviance. However, the original problem with the 737 MAX was the top management decision not to invest in a new airframe design for cost/strategic reasons, to oblige designers to implement various unsafe workarounds to accommodate larger and more fuel-efficient engines that made the plane unstable, and to ruthlessly silence engineers who argued that this was unsafe. This problem was compounded by the FAA's move to increased delegation of safety oversight to designer-manufacturers, which left it with insufficient ability independently to assess the new design. These are both big, important decisions made by top leaders of the two organizations, rather than the slow progressive evolution driven by people's efforts to optimize their bit of the workplace which characterizes drift to danger.
emarsden commented on Drift towards danger and the normalization of deviance (2017)   risk-engineering.org/conc... · Posted by u/rzk
throwaway984393 · a year ago
I find this kind of thing fascinating. In the BDSM rope bondage world there is a lot of ceremony and almost theatrics about safety. But there's actually no real safety, because the participants keep doing things everyone knows is unsafe. The Takate Kote tie is probably responsible for 80% of nerve impingement damage in rope bondage, yet it's wildly popular because people find it pleasing and they keep coming up with new variations on it. Every time you bring up its danger, people like to shout you down like you're over-reacting and they're sick of hearing from you, and then they go give some poor newbie wrist drop.
emarsden · a year ago
I did not have BDSM rope bondage in mind when I wrote that article, but nice to know that these concepts can be roped in more widely than anticipated!
emarsden commented on Drift towards danger and the normalization of deviance (2017)   risk-engineering.org/conc... · Posted by u/rzk
torginus · a year ago
This diagram looks weird to me, looks like being lazy counteracts the effects of being cheap, so that being both is less dangerous than just trying to save money or effort alone.
emarsden · a year ago
"Being cheap" is a pressure from management to increase production in order to avoid economic failure. "Being lazy" is an effort from frontline workers to improve efficiency and avoid being swamped by production demand. One of the points of the diagram is that these partially cancel each other out, but the net effect of the addition of these two "vectors" is to push the system towards the failure boundary.
emarsden commented on Ask HN: Is there any software you only made for your own use but nobody else?    · Posted by u/Crazyontap
emarsden · a year ago
I have a smartphone app that scrapes replay TV listings for a few shows that I like to watch at the gym and allows me to download the low-quality media stream to the phone to view offline ad-free.

I released the Rust library that downloads and reassembles media segments from a DASH stream (https://github.com/emarsden/dash-mpd-rs). Won't release the web scraping bits because they are against website terms and conditions, and because annoying countermeasures will be implemented if too many people use them.

emarsden commented on Stirling PDF: Self-hosted, web-based PDF manipulation tool   github.com/Stirling-Tools... · Posted by u/gitinit
apexalpha · a year ago
Just put a sniffer or network capture tool like Wireshark in between. Additionally you could restrict the apps network access entirely to just your local home network.
emarsden · a year ago
It seems that there is some missing tooling to make this convenient.

You can run a local bundle of HTML/JS/WASM in a web browser instance that you isolate (for example with firejail) to prevent network access. You distribute as a zip/tgz, but it's not obvious how to handle updates without a full redownload. Distributing with a full Electron-like interface is obviously overkill.

If you're running a web app that's hosted elsewhere (which will be much more convenient for most people), your web browser or the software isolation functionality (or firewall/proxy) needs to distinguish between the initial resource loads (approve) and later sneaky logging requests (ban).

There are Android applications such as TrackerControl that have related functionality (operates as a local VPN to filter all network requests and block tracking) but I don't know of convenient tools for the desktop (Linux, in particular).

emarsden commented on Stirling PDF: Self-hosted, web-based PDF manipulation tool   github.com/Stirling-Tools... · Posted by u/gitinit
TheCapeGreek · a year ago
That's a problem with just about any package, library or system you use in the end.

Open source runs in a large amount of trust, and we're all complicit.

emarsden · a year ago
Sure, but these types of applications are running in a web browser sandbox, which benefits from enormous engineering resources to protect the host computer from malicious actions by the remote code. I'm wondering whether this execution environment (augmented with some policy mechanism to allow apps to declare their URL access needs, a little like an AppArmor or network firewal policy) could also provide some guarantees concerning privacy or information security.
emarsden commented on Stirling PDF: Self-hosted, web-based PDF manipulation tool   github.com/Stirling-Tools... · Posted by u/gitinit
emarsden · a year ago
From the README: “Stirling PDF does not initiate any outbound calls for record-keeping or tracking purposes”. Beyond auditing the code, how could a potential user verify this claim in advance, and how can a web-based app help support such a claim (in particular when the app does need to make some web requests to operate, but only to a restricted list of URLs that might be listed in a manifest along the lines of a Content-Security-Policy for instance)?

This is a concrete problem when deploying apps that need the user to “upload” some sensitive content.

emarsden commented on US regulator considers stripping Boeing's right to self-inspect planes   on.ft.com/4aV0CQ7... · Posted by u/ryanisnan
keenmaster · 2 years ago
Self-regulatory bodies are usually centralized and separate from any individual corporation. They also tend to answer directly to a government agency and cannot be disciplined by a corporation. While there can still be issues such as a strong revolving door and potential indirect pressure to be nice to the regulated entities, it’s not as terrible as what Boeing and other airplane manufacturers get to do (inspect themselves in lieu of regulatory inspections). That’s strange, because lives are literally on the line, more so than some other industries with more independent examinations.
emarsden · 2 years ago
Historically, the fact that lives of the public are clearly on the line was part of the argument for allowing partial delegation of safety oversight. The idea has been that any engineer/manager making these decisions will be regularly flying themselves/loved ones, so is going to be suitably cautious. This differed from the situation in coal mines for example, where the miners exposed to the risk were socially/culturally disjoint from engineers/managers.
emarsden commented on US regulator considers stripping Boeing's right to self-inspect planes   on.ft.com/4aV0CQ7... · Posted by u/ryanisnan
brink · 2 years ago
What other industry is allowed to inspect itself? It completely ruins the point of an inspection. It's like being the judge and jury in your own trial. I'm amazed this is a thing in the first place.
emarsden · 2 years ago
There are several good reasons for allowing it. One is that it's difficult for a public inspectorate/regulator to maintain the necessary levels of expertise to assess such complex systems (and increasingly so with technological progress). Furthermore, people working inside the industry have much better access to information about the risks than an outside inspector has.

A second reason is simply costs to the public. In 2019, the interim FAA director Dan Elwell testified to the US Senate after the 737 Max disasters that bringing all delegated oversight back into the FAA would require 10000 extra staff and USD 1.8B in costs. There are fairness/democratic arguments to having the costs borne by the industry (and thus indirectly by the privileged portion of the taxpayers who consume air traffic) rather than by all taxpayers.

u/emarsden

KarmaCake day100October 26, 2018
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