Those are the breaks though when catering to a large audience with wildly differing threat models. Do you throw away users that are looking for a vague sense of security so they run off somewhere else less secure because you lack some feature?
If you are just looking for "secure(TM)[X]", you are making a mistake somewhere anyway.
If your life or livelihood depends on it, you learn what the impact of every choice is and you painstakingly keep to your opsec.
Somewhere between the two user action becomes a necessity. You need to judge where that point is for you and take responsibility for it because nobody else can guarantee it.
The history of Signal has been to provide the security properties we're talking about without users having to think about it or understand. To suddenly remove forward secrecy is a very big change, and it isn't one that they seem to have acknowledged or documented. Like this blog post: they are making an announcement that they have a "post-quantum ratchet," when they have effectively removed the ratchet. It's theater.
It solves the problem: How can a group of people (two or more people) securely communicate with each other.
The group has to mutually decide their risk profile, and then decide which features of the application to use. And each person in the group has to decide whether they can trust others in the group to follow the agreed upon opsec. Signal cannot solve these social problems.