The C++11 threadsafety guarantee on static initialization is explicitly scoped to block local statics. That's not an implementation detail, that's the guarantee.
The __cxa_guard_acquire/release machinery in the assembly is the standard fulfilling that contract. Move to a private static data member and you're outside that guarantee entirely. You've quietly handed that responsibility back to yourself.
Then there's the static initialization order fiasco, which is the whole reason the meyers singleton with a local static became canonical. Block local static initializes on first use, lazily, deterministically, thread safely. A static data member initializes at startup in an order that is undefined across translation units. If anything touches Instance() during its own static initialization from a different TU, you're in UB territory. The article doesn't mention this.
Real world singleton designs also need: deferred/configuration-driven initialization, optional instantiation, state recycling, controlled teardown. A block local static keeps those doors open. A static data member initializes unconditionally at startup, you've lost lazy-init, you've lost the option to not initialize it, and configuration based instantiation becomes awkward by design.
Honestly, if you're bottlenecking on singleton access, that's design smell worth addressing, not the guard variable.
One of the reasons I hate constructors and destructors.
Explicit init()/deinit() functions are much better.
On a 16 register machine with 9 call-clobbered registers and 7 call-invariant ones (one of which is the stack pointer) we put 6 temporaries into call-invariant registers (so there are 6 spills in the prologue of this big function), another 9 into the call-clobbered registers; 2 of those 9 are the helper function's arguments, but 7 other temporaries have to be spilled to survive the call. And the rest 25 temporaries live on the stack in the first place.
If we instead take a machine with 31 registers, 19 being call-clobbered and 12 call-invariant ones (one of which is a stack pointer), we can put 11 temporaries into call-invariant registers (so there are 11 spills in the prologue of this big function), and another 19 into the call-clobbered registers; 2 of those 19 are the helper function's arguments, so 17 other temporaries have to be spilled to survive the call. And the rest of 10 temporaries live on the stack in the first place.
So, there seems to be more spilling/reloading whether you count pre-emptive spills or the on-demand-at-the-call-site spills, at least to me.
"Deterministic" is not the the right constraint to introduce here. Plenty of software is non-deterministic (such as LLMs! But also, consensus protocols, request routing architecture, GPU kernels, etc) so why not compilers?
What a compiler needs is not determinism, but semantic closure. A system is semantically closed if the meanings of its outputs are fully defined within the system, correctness can be evaluated internally and errors are decidable. LLMs are semantically open. A semantically closed compiler will never output nonsense, even if its output is nondeterministic. But two runs of a (semantically closed) nondeterministic compiler may produce two correct programs, one being faster on one CPU and the other faster on another. Or such a compiler can be useful for enhancing security, e.g. programs behave identically, resist fingerprinting.
Nondeterminism simply means the compiler selects any element of an equivalence class. Semantic closure ensures the equivalence class is well‑defined.
Generating a 99% compliant C compiler is not a textbook task in any university I've ever heard of. There's a vast difference between a toy compiler and one that can actually compile Linux and Doom.
From a bit of research now, there are only three other compilers that can compile an unmodified Linux kernel: GCC, Clang/LLVM and Intel's oneAPI. I can't find any other compiler implementation that came close.
Aliasing issues is just yet another instance of C/C++ inferiority holding the industry back. C could've learnt from Fortran, but we ended up with the language we have...
void foo(void *a, void *b, int n) {
assume_aligned(a, 16);
assume_stride(a, 16);
assume_distinct(a, b);
... go and vectorize!
}Your salary (well, last years taxable income), debts/credit rating, criminal history, address, phone number, which vehicles and properties you own and which company boards you're on.
One of organized criminals biggest income these days are scamming rich old folks because it's so trivial to get all details needed (and who to target) to be a pretty convincing bankman, IRS type agent/etc.
Some of it you have to kind of manually request at various places, but it's all available.
So data breaches aren't really that big of a deal when everything is already public.
Reading Fil-C website's "InvisiCaps by example" page, I see that "Laundering Integers As Pointers" is disallowed. This essentially disqualifies Fil-C for low-level work, which makes for a substantial part of C programs.
(int2ptr for MMIO/pre-allocated memory is in theory UB, in practice just fine as long as you don't otherwise break aliasing rules (and lifetime rules in C++) - as the compiler will fail to track provenance at least once).
But that isn't really what Fil-C is aimed at - the value is, as you implied, in hardening userspace applications.
extern struct uart UART0;
Then place that symbol at address X in your linker script.