I find it very hard to follow the overall reasoning, in particular due to the inconsistency around whether one should only consider algebraic structures up to isomorphism or not.
For any n, there is only one finite cylic group of size n, up to isomorphism (namely Z/nZ). As the author mentions, there are concrete choices of finite cyclic groups (like Z/nZ) that make Diffie-Hellman insecure. Consequently, the security comes entirely from the choice of the _representation_ of the group elements (since the algebraic structure is the same, i.e., it is just a relabeled Z/nZ).
In a similar spirit, people sometimes argue that Diffie-Hellman in some group G must be equally secure as in another group H, because the groups are isomorphic. This is unsound. In order to make such an argument sound, one needs to prove (or at least mention in case it is trivial) that one can _efficiently_ compute the isomorphism and its inverse.
For any n, there is only one finite cylic group of size n, up to isomorphism (namely Z/nZ). As the author mentions, there are concrete choices of finite cyclic groups (like Z/nZ) that make Diffie-Hellman insecure. Consequently, the security comes entirely from the choice of the _representation_ of the group elements (since the algebraic structure is the same, i.e., it is just a relabeled Z/nZ).
In a similar spirit, people sometimes argue that Diffie-Hellman in some group G must be equally secure as in another group H, because the groups are isomorphic. This is unsound. In order to make such an argument sound, one needs to prove (or at least mention in case it is trivial) that one can _efficiently_ compute the isomorphism and its inverse.