Neither this issue, which doesn't appear to be a bug at all but merely an unimplemented feature, nor the fact that uutils doesn't (yet) pass the entire testsuite, seem to me to at all be an indictment of the uutils project, merely a sign that it is incomplete. Which is hardly surprising when I get the impression it's primarily been a hobby project for a bunch of different developers. It does make me wonder about the wisdom of Ubuntu moving to it.
The core bug seems to be that support for `date -r <file>` wasn't implemented at the time ubuntu integrated it [1, 2].
And the command silently accepted -r before and did nothing (!)
0: https://lwn.net/Articles/1043123/
These and Sysinternals (bought by Microsoft around 2006) were must have when I was still using Windows.
Still, I don’t understand how npmjs.help doesn’t immediately trigger red flags… it’s the perfect stereotype of an obvious scam domain. Maybe falling just short of npmjshelp.nigerianprince.net.
should practice it for ENTER your password, ENTER your 2FA ;)
> Still, I don’t understand how npmjs.help doesn’t immediately trigger red flags
1. it probably did for quite a few recipients, but that's never going to be 100% 2. not helped by the current practices of the industry in general, many domains in use, hard sometimes to know if it's legit or not (some actors are worse in this regard than others)
Either way, someone somewhere won't pay enough attention because they're tired, or stressed out, or they are just going through 100 emails, etc.
Last I checked, we're still in a world where the large majority of people with important online accounts (like, say, at their bank, where they might not have the option to disable online banking entirely) wouldn't be able to tell you what any of those things are, and don't have the option to use anything but SMS-based TOTP for most online services and maybe "app"-based (maybe even a desktop program in rare cases!) TOTP for most of the rest. If they even have 2FA at all.
At least the crowd here should _know_ that TOTP doesn't do anything against phishing, and most of the critical infrastructure for code and other things support U2F so people should use it.
An internal engineer there who did a bunch of security work phished like half of her own company (testing, obviously). Her conclusion, in a really well-done talk, was that it was impossible. No human measures will reduce it given her success at a very disciplined, highly security conscious place.
The only thing that works is yubikeys which prevent this type of credential + 2fa theft phishing attack.
edit:
karla burnette / talk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z20XNp-luNA
https://karla.io/files/ichthyology-wp.pdf
> At Stripe, rather than focusing on mitigating more basic attacks with phishing training, we decided to invest our time in preventing credential phishing entirely. We did this using a combination of Single Sign On (SSO), SSL client certificates, and Universal Second Factor (U2F)
The rest is handled by preferring plain text over HTML, and if some moron only sends HTML mails to carefully dissect it first. Allowing HTML mails was one of the biggest mistakes for HTML we've ever made - zero benefits with huge attack surface.
That's exactly why I said all the other "helpful" recommendations and warning signs people are using are never foolproof, and thus mostly useless given the scale at which phishing campaigns operate.
Great if it helps you in the general case, terrible if it lulls you into a sense of confidence when it's actually a phishing email using the right email address.
[1] https://dpreview.com/articles/9828658229/computational-photo...