Seriously, on a Linux system, I update everything except the kernel without a reboot. Why can’t Windows do this?
With things like kpatch you can even update the kernel without a reboot
Readit Newscassonmars commented on Update and shut down no longer restarts PC, 25H2 patch addresses decades-old bug windowslatest.com/2025/11... · Posted by u/taubek
cassonmars commented on Intent to Deprecate and Remove XSLT groups.google.com/a/chrom... · Posted by u/CharlesW
XSLT is great, but its core problem is that the tooling is awful. And a lot of this has to do with the primary author of the XSLT specification, keeping a proprietary (and expensive) library as the main library that implements the ungodly terse spec. Simpler standards and open tooling won out, not just because it was simpler, but because there wasn't someone chiefly in charge of the spec essentially making the tooling an enterprise sales funnel. A shame.
cassonmars commented on Road to ZK Implementation: Nethermind Client's Path to Proofs nethermind.io/blog/road-t... · Posted by u/benaadams
> a tiny math receipt
Im not familiar with how these zk proofs work, but for a PoW scheme I was working with the binary proofs were over 60kb - and they were sample based to decrease probability of cheating - not an absolute proof without full replay.
Do you have some info/resource to describe how these proofs work and can be so small?
There's different proof constructions, but many are depending on recursive SNARKs. You basically have an execution harness prover (proves that the block of VM instructions and inputs were correct in producing the output), and then a folding circuit prover (that proves the execution harness behaved correctly), recursively folding over the outer circuit to a smaller size. In Ethereum world, a lot of the SNARKs use a trusted setup — the assumption is that for as long as one contributor to the ceremony was honest (and that there wasn't a flaw in the ceremony itself), then the trusted setup can be trusted. The outsized benefit of the trusted setup approach is that it allows you to shift the computational hardness assumption over to the statistical improbability of being able to forge proof outputs for desired inputs. This of course, assumes that the trusted setup was safe, and that quantum computers aren't able to break dlog any time soon
cassonmars commented on Do YC after you graduate: Early decision for students ycombinator.com/early-dec... · Posted by u/snowmaker
Does YC ever intend to revisit doing remote batches again?
There's many founders in the country who are just as driven and motivated, but have real-world situations that cannot allow uprooting themselves for several months, two very common ones:
- new parents
- disabled family members, or are themselves physically disabled
The discourse on Hacker News has frequently chastised companies demanding RTO, and some of the companies in your portfolio are remote-first (or remote-only), why does YC make the same kind of RTO demand with batches?
cassonmars commented on Deliberate Abstraction entropicthoughts.com/deli... · Posted by u/todsacerdoti
> Try mentally taking apart a car. Can you point to the component that supplies the transportation functionality?
Transportation, in agile terms, isn't a feature or primary function – it's an epic. I agree with the conclusion that emergent behaviors cannot be well implemented solely as features, but it's also somewhat tautological, and the argument can only be constructed from the initial (invalid) premise.
cassonmars commented on Magic Lantern Is Back magiclantern.fm/forum/ind... · Posted by u/felipemesquita
From a security mindset, I was thinking this had made a return: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_Lantern_(spyware)
I was pleasantly surprised to find out this was something very different.
cassonmars commented on Monero appears to be in the midst of a successful 51% attack twitter.com/p3b7_/status/... · Posted by u/treyd
Monero has been under constant attack from its inception. It’s one of the only truly anonymous, untraceable payment systems so there has been a huge push to make it unviable. It was unexplainably delisted from major crypto exchanges in the past and now is under direct attack.
It's not inexplicable, they just don't want to explain that their asset listings are effectively beholden to banking partners in the same way that steam was forced to remove certain games because of Visa and Mastercard.
cassonmars commented on Public Signal Backups Testing community.signalusers.org... · Posted by u/blendergeek
The backup is secured with "a strong key", implying that all PFS guarantees go out the window regardless of the PFS algorithm used to send the messages in the first place. Signal had great guarantees by how they both enforced a single client and was limited largely to screenshots as backups, now you'll never know if the person you're talking to has a full backup in the cloud, with metadata to match the actual conversation times, destroying the repudiability (i.e. plausible deniability) feature.
>difficult to cancel subscriptions
>magically reroutes to new card numbers no matter how complicated the change
>out $500
I don't need to play 20 Questions to know you're talking about legalzoom
cassonmars commented on Hell is overconfident developers writing encryption code soatok.blog/2025/01/31/he... · Posted by u/zdw
What a coincidence! I was just browsing the Shamir's Secret Sharing Wikipedia page 30 seconds ago. There is a python implementation on it and I was worried the same exact thing as you before opening HN. So maybe we could start with that one. Is that code implementation sufficiently secure and well documented?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir's_secret_sharing?wprov=...
No, it is not.
The arithmetic used is not constant time, meaning the actual computational steps involved leak information about the secret, were either the recombination of the shares or the initial splitting were observed via side channels.
The arithmetic does not guard against party identifiers being zero or overflowing to zero, although it is not likely to occur when used this way.