[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_Next_Generation
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_Next_Generation
But on the development side, the situation is less clear. There is no major development project anymore since A350 is in operation. And there are no signs yet of an upcoming major program based on their research activities for hydrogen-powered of more electric airliners.
So there could still be layoffs or downsizing due to hiring less engineers than the ones that go to retirement.
Gwynne Shotwell
Disclosure: I work on satellite design and in the recent years on a program that is part of the NewSpace. I have an intimate knowledge of how what I help design works but a limited knowledge of what others may be doing.
A couple of insights:
* I started working on satellites in a large industrial group where, while not being handled by world class cybersecurity experts, secure communications with the satellites rely on a sane use of proven encryption protocols
* I am not sure when this level of security became standard and what was done to secure the satellites before hardware-level encryption with modern algorithms became available
* I was astounded when I discovered the level of casualness for everything related to security on scientific satellite projects, with even recent projects led by major agencies considering that always encrypting command and monitoring is overkill
And my main grip is that the study relies on asking universities that have the lowest bar in terms of caring about security (they already struggle enough to build a working thing) and then extrapolating from a specious argument that it must be worse on commercial spacecrafts.
> One surprising result was that the larger the satellite, the more vulnerable it was. Larger machinery typically used more commercial off-the-shelf components and was thus more vulnerable since the code base was public, whereas smaller CubeSats tended to use custom code.
Also
> a satellite should be designed so that TCs do not compromise the satellite’s stability without further validation
Says who ? What validation ? If an operator had the right to have a telecommand sent to the satellite, who or what aboard the satellite should decide if this telecommand was legitimate.
From experience, there is a myriad of things that you think are usually not a good idea to make your satellite do and then, when you need it as a workaround or mitigation for an unexpected condition, you are happy you have not implemented a list of authorized actions that is too constrained.
PS: It reminds me of the guy that was able to capture the GPS coordinates of an airplane broadcasted to the In-Flight Entertainment systems and got a lot of press coverage by extrapolating that it meant he could also take control of the aircraft from his seat in the cabin.
If the EU Commission proposed the appointment, then it's a safe bet the commission itself is captured/corrupt. Very corrupt, given how outrageous appointing a non-EU-citizen to a high-ranking EU political position is.
It has been for quite some time (at least it was already dragging this reputation for the EU constitution referendum in 2005).
To the point that the schematic vision for EU organization is the EU parliament expected to represent EU citizens vs. the EU commission expected to defend private interests.
And Ursula von der Leyen has a horrendous track record when it comes to doing anything remotely positive. But having Margrethe Vestager defend this appointment was more of a letdown.
I've worked with so many truly incompetent and stupid teams and organizations, that have millions to billions of dollars. Sometimes I wonder if I've just hallucinated all the books and training I've taken that explain the basic business and industry concepts most people should know. And I wonder how it is an IC could seem to know how things should be working while seemingly nobody else does.
Then I go back to my 1/30th of the widget and wait for lunch time.
And all of them have deemed you a suitable fit for their incompetent and stupid team or organization.
6 months later and they still haven't got a working implementation.
At that time there was a reference port for the Hercules development board available on-line. It was mostly working straight out of the box. I just had to fix a few issues with the Halcogen generated files (since then, TI has fixed the bugs), configure the lwIP options (to have DHCP and only use UDP). Since then (7 years ago), I have not touched the code once.