This is an extremely long and unfocused analysis of what was a fairly straightforward incident. Following the lightning strike, which created a dangerous, but manageable situation, the main contributors to the catastrophic outcome were (roughly):
80% - Pilot error. Poor adherence to procedures and checklists. Poor choices all around. Poor piloting in manual mode and botched touchdown. Part of the blame for this rests with Aeroflot, for putting such a pilot in the air.
15% - People retrieving their luggage slowed down the evacuation and increased death toll.
5% - Aircraft design. Could be improved in some areas, but no really serious bloopers.
~0% - Delayed emergency response. Not good, but partly caused by incorrect communication from pilot. Also, fire spread so fast, it's not likely they could have changed anything.
Such long reads might not be for everyone, but I think the article actually does a very good job at listing all the contributing factors of the accident, while not trying to assign percentages of the blame to the participants. Sure, the pilots made errors, but they were thrown into an unexpected situation (having to manually control a plane with controls that were not designed for doing that) without sufficient training to adequately prepare them for flying in "direct mode" - which, due to various issues with the SSJ, happened far more frequently than initially expected.
What you say is true, but I would still disagree with the overall assessment. To put it bluntly, it is the pilot's job to be thrown into unexpected situations. Modern airliners mostly fly themselves, and the pilots are there to a) coordinate with ATC b) step in when the shit hits the fan, which does happen with some regularity. Ultimately this accident was caused by a confluence of many factors, as is often the case, but my read on the situation is that a competent pilot should have been able to handle this emergency without any losses.
> I know as a matter of personal experience that there are many people in Russia who are genuinely dedicated to doing things right, and I have no doubt that many of them work in the aviation industry. Granted, many of the best have left since 2022, but plenty remain. The problem is that apathy has been enshrined on an institutional level, trapping the people who care under the weight of those who do not, or who choose not to for purposes of survival. Such a culture is not easily rooted out.
As the US gradually starts to resemble its former nemesis and we become numbed to the daily outrage, I can feel myself becoming increasingly resigned and so this passage touched a nerve. I worry what happens when we have driven out those in public service who were committed to doing what's right. Which becomes further dispiriting.
It's not 80% pilot error, but poor training, signature of many Russian airlines. In fact, all 3 accidents last 6 years (this one, 2020 Ural Airlines field crash landing near Moscow, 2023 field landing near Novosibirsk) were due to pilot inadequate training, leading to inadequate behavior (ZIA case) or overreacting to issues (the diversion to OVB).
If you watch some traffic landing videos, Russian planes sometimes land on the front wheels, exactly because of overspeed. The belief that you need to land slightly faster than the speed in the manual, is very frequent. Some companies did change this recently, though.
And the plane in the OP was switched to "direct control mode". The default mode is like Airbus fly-by-wire where the yoke sets vertical speed. The direct control mode is like Boeing's. The pilots were not prepared for this kind of change.
I get the sense that part of what's going on here is that training is treated as a box-checking exercise, rather than as a genuine opportunity for learning and improvement. I wouldn't be surprised if there's also some institutional pressure for trainers to not fail pilots who perform poorly in training.
It's poor pilot judgment, period. Not sure that's the kind of thing that training can overcome. It's downhill from the moment they decide to ignore the incoming storm. I read the whole thing and my conclusion is that the man is a moron and shouldn't have been allowed near an airplane, ever.
Aeroflot 1492 was an emergency landing (due to earlier lightning strike that scrambled electronics) during which the plane bounced off the runway, rupturing fuel tanks and causing a fire. Of the 78 people onboard, 41 died.
Hard landing by pilot error/poor training is probably the biggest factor. But "people retrieving their luggage" points to inadequate crew training and emergency response more than anything. I don't believe it's fair to principally blame the pax (over the crew) for the disaster. Perhaps in conjunction with the crew, who ought to undergo scrutiny first.
Wrt the pax taking luggage, fta "one of the flight attendants attempted to make a public address system announcement, “Seat belts off, leave everything, get out!” But she forgot to press the PA button and this command was broadcast to the cockpit via the interphone instead. Only a few passengers at the front heard the command to “leave everything.”"
This is an exhaustive and insightful document of a largely preventable tragedy—one that does justice to those who perished, as well as the victims of all air accidents with its even-handed analyses and unflinching details.
Its revelation of how deeply flawed the systems, agencies, companies, and people involved in this accident carries a stark unsaid warning for the direction the United States is heading. Accountability, objectivity, expertise, and transparency are critical in so many aspects, and much like Chernobyl, this article reveals how hardly perceptible erosions of these values build up to untenable states of affairs. Ignoring the warning signs brings down empires.
Side note: The author even included a little nugget for the HN crowd:
> Aeroflot’s dissenting opinion was typed up in a Microsoft Word document, or similar, with default settings. I don’t know why but I find that vaguely amusing.
> Instead, the accident was the result of a convergence of numerous deficiencies associated with all three, none of which were causal by themselves, but were causal in concert. Furthermore, the breadth and depth of the deficiencies identified in this investigation was such that it calls into question the safety of Russia’s entire aviation sector.
> I know as a matter of personal experience that there are many people in Russia who are genuinely dedicated to doing things right, and I have no doubt that many of them work in the aviation industry. Granted, many of the best have left since 2022, but plenty remain. The problem is that apathy has been enshrined on an institutional level, trapping the people who care under the weight of those who do not, or who choose not to for purposes of survival. Such a culture is not easily rooted out.
One thing that is very noticeable is that since 2022, incidents in Russia largely no longer show up on avherald. I'm not sure if this is because the website no longer reports them, or because reports are not made in Russia, but it makes me feel a lot less comfortable.
In general it has become incredibly hard to judge the safety of Russia's aviation from the west.
But we already know aviation safety in Russia is on a downward spiral, because the sanctions make it very difficult to get spare parts and, as the article notes, even notionally Russian aircraft like the SSJ-100 still rely on numerous Western parts.
> the sanctions make it very difficult to get spare parts
The crash described in the article is from 2019, so before meaningful sanctions against Russia were implemented. Also, the article makes a pretty good job at mentioning other factors that also contribute to Russia's bad aviation safety:
> The MAK’s final report contains 49 recommendations to improve everything from simulator record-keeping to the location of the SSJ’s on-board megaphones. Many of these recommendations directly address the deficiencies described throughout this article. But despite the passage of more than 6 years since the crash, the section of the report listing safety actions taken to date contains only one entry, concerning an update to Russia’s USSR-era airport fire rescue standards. This is an abysmally inadequate response. Where is the outrage? Where is the commitment to “never again”?
It always surprises me that system changes like Alternate and Direct Law, or Sukhoi's Direct Mode, are quite so different from normal operation. I'm sure they have a really good reason not to make Normal Law better mimic Direct Law (but with all the safety systems), and maybe the reason I don't understand it is because I tend to read about the times when dropping into Alternate or Direct Law resulted in an incident?
One of the patterns I try to follow in designing our operations is that the tasks we need to follow in an emergency should be as close to routine as we can make them. We don't have a manual override to deploy into production in case of emergency, we make sure that our normal deploy process is suitable for emergency use. Which means we won't make the emergency worse by messing up a manual deploy.
Similarly, my car has some fancy drive-by-wire features -- the steering is dynamic, and the throttle balances the electric motor and petrol engine seamlessly. But the manufacturer didn't change anything fundamental about the controls, and if the power steering fails (or the cruise control stops working, or the radar can't track the vehicle in front) I lose some affordances and some safety systems but I can still drive the car.
It is true that the non-normal modes are supposed to only very infrequently activate, but with that in mind it should surely be more important to not drop users into a totally different control regime?
Hoping someone has some more insight. I don't have anything to do with avionics in general, and the day job isn't safety-critical, but I'm always keen to learn and I've definitely learned a lot over the years that I can apply to the day job by reading about how people design systems to stay safe when a failure means loss of life.
Think of normal mode more like adaptive cruise control with lane keeping. When everything works, it’s much easier to control the car, but if the data necessary to feed the control laws go bad, the car has to drop back to the regular old gas/brake + steering wheel (i.e., direct mode) or it may crash. Getting the handover right is obviously tricky though.
In this case, if your IMU or airspeed data looks bad, your attitude estimate can’t be relied on and you can’t be certain that any derived values you’re controlling to are valid or stable. Current designs assume the best course of action in those cases is to hand control over to the pilot.
Cruise control was one of the things I was thinking of, actually -- but the brake and accelerator on every car I've used cruise control with, still act as a brake and an accelerator. If I engage with the controls, they act in the way they'd act if the assistance was missing. Sometimes with warnings or stops (lane departure, speed limiters), often with smarter behaviour than might be apparent (regenerative braking, hybrid power trains, adaptive steering, radar/lidar support).
Airbus's Normal Law sounds more akin to a car that maintains its current speed and rate of turn if no inputs are given, so if you lift your foot off the accelerator then the car doesn't slow down and if you let go of the steering wheel then it doesn't wobble or re-centre. It might be easier to drive when the assistance is working, but it's not going to be easy to transition to regular brake, accelerator, and steering functions if the assistance needs to switch off.
You might be surprised (or not) to learn that some modern cars are fully brake-by-wire; no mechanical connection between the pedal and the hydraulics [0]. Mostly hybrid or fully electric cars. Many "emergency" brakes are now merely parking brakes driven by an electric motor. Afaik there are no fully steer-by-wire cars on the road today, thankfully.
I am similarly confused at the lack of sustained training in direct law/mode flight. The primary reason for the difference in operation is convenience and smoothness of flight achieved by intentional control stick movements as opposed to direct aerodynamic surface control, but like the article said pilots should have a comprehensive mental operating model of what the "normal" law/mode is producing at the control surfaces.
> According to a footnote in the MAK report, at the time of the accident the flight crew operations manual (FCOM, a Sukhoi product) contained descriptions of Airbus controls laws instead of SSJ control laws. The reasons for this darkly hilarious mix-up are not elucidated in the report.
That is shocking, but not that shocking if you're familiar with how things are done in those parts.
So SSJ doesn't implement Alternate Law (mode) only Direct Law, but Sukhoi inserted Alternate Law descriptions from Airbus into the manual anyway. Just yolo copy-paste basically.
> UAC calculated that the probability of a Direct Mode reversion should be approximately 1 per 1.64 million flight hours [...] In 2015 alone, there were three such events, even though the entire SSJ fleet had accumulated just 81,000 flying hours
Heh "Our SLA is still in play, we just extended the time we'll average it by to 100 years"
Maybe the FCOM was actually the design specification, i.e. how they wanted it to work, which however had significant differences from the final product?
The article later points out that the many Direct Mode reversions probably have something to do with the Electronic Interface Units (EIUs) which are responsible for making sure the various off-the-shelf Western components (which were apparently not customized due to cost reasons) could talk to each other. So the only Russian-made (and thus technologically not so advanced) component in your design is also a single point of failure. What could go wrong?
> Maybe the FCOM was actually the design specification, i.e. how they wanted it to work, which however had significant differences from the final product?
Agree, that's probably what happened, yeah. It was probably a planned feature they had to cut at the last minute.
>I'm always astounded by the self-centeredness humans are capable of.
In this instance I'm sorry but this is the wrong take. The fantastic article directly addresses that in fact, and it jives with what I was taught as part of first responder and mountain rescue training in the US, as well as have heard from EMTs and volunteer firefighters I know:
>"However, research has shown that when untrained civilians are unexpectedly placed into an emergency aboard an aircraft, many people’s brains revert to what they already know, which is to stand up, grab their bags, and walk to the exit, as though nothing is wrong. This behavioral tendency can be short-circuited if the flight attendants loudly and assertively order passengers to leave their bags behind and exit immediately. But on flight 1492, the order to leave bags behind was not heard by the majority of the passengers because the senior flight attendant forgot to press the PA button before making the announcement."
Again, this jives with everything from military to emergency response of all sorts: in high stress maximal flight/fight rapid response sorts of situations, humans tend to (a) revert to whatever "muscle memory" or drilled in training they've got, if any, or else whatever basic instinct/patterns they've developed, (b) follow authoritative instructions, if available and simply/rapidly understandable, (c) panic, or (d) freeze up. Just as with everything else with safety, humans must be recognized as humans and be part of an overall systemic approach if we wish to improve outcomes as much as possible.
So if you're dealing with untrained random civilians who have no particular "muscle memory" to draw on beyond the typical, then crew procedures, aircraft design etc have to account for that. That's just part of the responsibility of running a civilian facing service involving life/safety. Better training for the cabin crew might have helped here just as better training could have prevented the situation happening at all, and identically better mechanical designs might also have helped and be worth considering in principle if this was frequent enough. This could range from how PA systems work (perhaps when an emergency landing is triggered, PA should automatically go to open mode and stay that way, or perhaps the evac warning including "LEAVE ALL BAGS BEHIND, EVACUATE NOW OR DIE" should be fully automated and just start broadcasting once emergency slides are deployed) to having overhead bins automatically seal and be impossible to open so somebody could at most spend a few seconds trying before realizing they can't (this would require actual study and cost/benefit tradeoff investigation of course). But the take away in disasters should not be any sort of moral one liner. These are massive systems with large numbers of people being forced to deal with a (literally here) by-the-second lethal scenario. Safety is a systemic issue.
The scientific record is pretty clear that most humans struggle to do even basic things in emergency, high pressure situations like being in arms reach of a 600C fire
I remember the fire alarm going off at a hotel I was staying at. Rushed the stairwell and it was already jam-packed by people who had brought every single piece of luggage they owned with them.
Actually the article (and a sibling comment) touches on this and it's not necessarily so simple ("there but for the grace of God go I")
> In one sense, this blame is constructive insofar as shame is an effective motivator for people who might otherwise try to get their luggage during a future evacuation. However, research has shown that when untrained civilians are unexpectedly placed into an emergency aboard an aircraft, many people’s brains revert to what they already know, which is to stand up, grab their bags, and walk to the exit, as though nothing is wrong. This behavioral tendency can be short-circuited if the flight attendants loudly and assertively order passengers to leave their bags behind and exit immediately. But on flight 1492, the order to leave bags behind was not heard by the majority of the passengers because the senior flight attendant forgot to press the PA button before making the announcement.
Tangential: along with the admiral’s excellent reporting, does anyone have or know any other good sources to read up on aviation safety? The AOPA air safety institute is one I know of (they make excellent YouTube videos on their channel), and I’ve heard the NTSB themselves upload videos to their YT channel to. Any other names/sources?
(Dan Gryder is, IMO, on the opposite end of the spectrum from Juan.)
VASAviation has a bunch of radar recreations, but if you’re new to aviation safety and never flown under ATC, you might not get as much from it as you would from a more commentary-based treatment: https://youtube.com/@vasaviation?si=__ZSdYSR1YgTOpge
Sad to hear that Paul has retired, I loved his videos and articles.
But I was already expecting it rather sooner than later, and his retirement is certainly well deserved. I hope he enjoys it, and maybe his face comes up again some time.
I always check pprune (professional pilots rumour network) on any recent crashes, as many of the posters are pilots. However it's a forum so you have to wade through the usual idiots and arguments.
Readit News
80% - Pilot error. Poor adherence to procedures and checklists. Poor choices all around. Poor piloting in manual mode and botched touchdown. Part of the blame for this rests with Aeroflot, for putting such a pilot in the air.
15% - People retrieving their luggage slowed down the evacuation and increased death toll.
5% - Aircraft design. Could be improved in some areas, but no really serious bloopers.
~0% - Delayed emergency response. Not good, but partly caused by incorrect communication from pilot. Also, fire spread so fast, it's not likely they could have changed anything.
> I know as a matter of personal experience that there are many people in Russia who are genuinely dedicated to doing things right, and I have no doubt that many of them work in the aviation industry. Granted, many of the best have left since 2022, but plenty remain. The problem is that apathy has been enshrined on an institutional level, trapping the people who care under the weight of those who do not, or who choose not to for purposes of survival. Such a culture is not easily rooted out.
As the US gradually starts to resemble its former nemesis and we become numbed to the daily outrage, I can feel myself becoming increasingly resigned and so this passage touched a nerve. I worry what happens when we have driven out those in public service who were committed to doing what's right. Which becomes further dispiriting.
If you watch some traffic landing videos, Russian planes sometimes land on the front wheels, exactly because of overspeed. The belief that you need to land slightly faster than the speed in the manual, is very frequent. Some companies did change this recently, though.
And the plane in the OP was switched to "direct control mode". The default mode is like Airbus fly-by-wire where the yoke sets vertical speed. The direct control mode is like Boeing's. The pilots were not prepared for this kind of change.
Hard landing by pilot error/poor training is probably the biggest factor. But "people retrieving their luggage" points to inadequate crew training and emergency response more than anything. I don't believe it's fair to principally blame the pax (over the crew) for the disaster. Perhaps in conjunction with the crew, who ought to undergo scrutiny first.
Wrt the pax taking luggage, fta "one of the flight attendants attempted to make a public address system announcement, “Seat belts off, leave everything, get out!” But she forgot to press the PA button and this command was broadcast to the cockpit via the interphone instead. Only a few passengers at the front heard the command to “leave everything.”"
Its revelation of how deeply flawed the systems, agencies, companies, and people involved in this accident carries a stark unsaid warning for the direction the United States is heading. Accountability, objectivity, expertise, and transparency are critical in so many aspects, and much like Chernobyl, this article reveals how hardly perceptible erosions of these values build up to untenable states of affairs. Ignoring the warning signs brings down empires.
Side note: The author even included a little nugget for the HN crowd:
> Aeroflot’s dissenting opinion was typed up in a Microsoft Word document, or similar, with default settings. I don’t know why but I find that vaguely amusing.
One thing that is very noticeable is that since 2022, incidents in Russia largely no longer show up on avherald. I'm not sure if this is because the website no longer reports them, or because reports are not made in Russia, but it makes me feel a lot less comfortable.
In general it has become incredibly hard to judge the safety of Russia's aviation from the west.
But we already know aviation safety in Russia is on a downward spiral, because the sanctions make it very difficult to get spare parts and, as the article notes, even notionally Russian aircraft like the SSJ-100 still rely on numerous Western parts.
The crash described in the article is from 2019, so before meaningful sanctions against Russia were implemented. Also, the article makes a pretty good job at mentioning other factors that also contribute to Russia's bad aviation safety:
> The MAK’s final report contains 49 recommendations to improve everything from simulator record-keeping to the location of the SSJ’s on-board megaphones. Many of these recommendations directly address the deficiencies described throughout this article. But despite the passage of more than 6 years since the crash, the section of the report listing safety actions taken to date contains only one entry, concerning an update to Russia’s USSR-era airport fire rescue standards. This is an abysmally inadequate response. Where is the outrage? Where is the commitment to “never again”?
I know, but last time I was looking they were all sourced from some telegram channels and none of had official data associated with it.
Can't they get such western parts thru China?
One of the patterns I try to follow in designing our operations is that the tasks we need to follow in an emergency should be as close to routine as we can make them. We don't have a manual override to deploy into production in case of emergency, we make sure that our normal deploy process is suitable for emergency use. Which means we won't make the emergency worse by messing up a manual deploy.
Similarly, my car has some fancy drive-by-wire features -- the steering is dynamic, and the throttle balances the electric motor and petrol engine seamlessly. But the manufacturer didn't change anything fundamental about the controls, and if the power steering fails (or the cruise control stops working, or the radar can't track the vehicle in front) I lose some affordances and some safety systems but I can still drive the car.
It is true that the non-normal modes are supposed to only very infrequently activate, but with that in mind it should surely be more important to not drop users into a totally different control regime?
Hoping someone has some more insight. I don't have anything to do with avionics in general, and the day job isn't safety-critical, but I'm always keen to learn and I've definitely learned a lot over the years that I can apply to the day job by reading about how people design systems to stay safe when a failure means loss of life.
In this case, if your IMU or airspeed data looks bad, your attitude estimate can’t be relied on and you can’t be certain that any derived values you’re controlling to are valid or stable. Current designs assume the best course of action in those cases is to hand control over to the pilot.
Airbus's Normal Law sounds more akin to a car that maintains its current speed and rate of turn if no inputs are given, so if you lift your foot off the accelerator then the car doesn't slow down and if you let go of the steering wheel then it doesn't wobble or re-centre. It might be easier to drive when the assistance is working, but it's not going to be easy to transition to regular brake, accelerator, and steering functions if the assistance needs to switch off.
I am similarly confused at the lack of sustained training in direct law/mode flight. The primary reason for the difference in operation is convenience and smoothness of flight achieved by intentional control stick movements as opposed to direct aerodynamic surface control, but like the article said pilots should have a comprehensive mental operating model of what the "normal" law/mode is producing at the control surfaces.
[0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brake-by-wire
That is shocking, but not that shocking if you're familiar with how things are done in those parts.
So SSJ doesn't implement Alternate Law (mode) only Direct Law, but Sukhoi inserted Alternate Law descriptions from Airbus into the manual anyway. Just yolo copy-paste basically.
> UAC calculated that the probability of a Direct Mode reversion should be approximately 1 per 1.64 million flight hours [...] In 2015 alone, there were three such events, even though the entire SSJ fleet had accumulated just 81,000 flying hours
Heh "Our SLA is still in play, we just extended the time we'll average it by to 100 years"
The article later points out that the many Direct Mode reversions probably have something to do with the Electronic Interface Units (EIUs) which are responsible for making sure the various off-the-shelf Western components (which were apparently not customized due to cost reasons) could talk to each other. So the only Russian-made (and thus technologically not so advanced) component in your design is also a single point of failure. What could go wrong?
Agree, that's probably what happened, yeah. It was probably a planned feature they had to cut at the last minute.
I'm always astounded by the self-centeredness humans are capable of.
In this instance I'm sorry but this is the wrong take. The fantastic article directly addresses that in fact, and it jives with what I was taught as part of first responder and mountain rescue training in the US, as well as have heard from EMTs and volunteer firefighters I know:
>"However, research has shown that when untrained civilians are unexpectedly placed into an emergency aboard an aircraft, many people’s brains revert to what they already know, which is to stand up, grab their bags, and walk to the exit, as though nothing is wrong. This behavioral tendency can be short-circuited if the flight attendants loudly and assertively order passengers to leave their bags behind and exit immediately. But on flight 1492, the order to leave bags behind was not heard by the majority of the passengers because the senior flight attendant forgot to press the PA button before making the announcement."
Again, this jives with everything from military to emergency response of all sorts: in high stress maximal flight/fight rapid response sorts of situations, humans tend to (a) revert to whatever "muscle memory" or drilled in training they've got, if any, or else whatever basic instinct/patterns they've developed, (b) follow authoritative instructions, if available and simply/rapidly understandable, (c) panic, or (d) freeze up. Just as with everything else with safety, humans must be recognized as humans and be part of an overall systemic approach if we wish to improve outcomes as much as possible.
So if you're dealing with untrained random civilians who have no particular "muscle memory" to draw on beyond the typical, then crew procedures, aircraft design etc have to account for that. That's just part of the responsibility of running a civilian facing service involving life/safety. Better training for the cabin crew might have helped here just as better training could have prevented the situation happening at all, and identically better mechanical designs might also have helped and be worth considering in principle if this was frequent enough. This could range from how PA systems work (perhaps when an emergency landing is triggered, PA should automatically go to open mode and stay that way, or perhaps the evac warning including "LEAVE ALL BAGS BEHIND, EVACUATE NOW OR DIE" should be fully automated and just start broadcasting once emergency slides are deployed) to having overhead bins automatically seal and be impossible to open so somebody could at most spend a few seconds trying before realizing they can't (this would require actual study and cost/benefit tradeoff investigation of course). But the take away in disasters should not be any sort of moral one liner. These are massive systems with large numbers of people being forced to deal with a (literally here) by-the-second lethal scenario. Safety is a systemic issue.
> In one sense, this blame is constructive insofar as shame is an effective motivator for people who might otherwise try to get their luggage during a future evacuation. However, research has shown that when untrained civilians are unexpectedly placed into an emergency aboard an aircraft, many people’s brains revert to what they already know, which is to stand up, grab their bags, and walk to the exit, as though nothing is wrong. This behavioral tendency can be short-circuited if the flight attendants loudly and assertively order passengers to leave their bags behind and exit immediately. But on flight 1492, the order to leave bags behind was not heard by the majority of the passengers because the senior flight attendant forgot to press the PA button before making the announcement.
Also, pretty low volume but also low sensationalism the Australian regulator, ATSB, posts report summaries on YouTube.
E.g. https://youtu.be/dum4SfnX8uk
Deleted Comment
(Dan Gryder is, IMO, on the opposite end of the spectrum from Juan.)
VASAviation has a bunch of radar recreations, but if you’re new to aviation safety and never flown under ATC, you might not get as much from it as you would from a more commentary-based treatment: https://youtube.com/@vasaviation?si=__ZSdYSR1YgTOpge
But I was already expecting it rather sooner than later, and his retirement is certainly well deserved. I hope he enjoys it, and maybe his face comes up again some time.
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