The ATC is faultless in the incident: listen to the audio, he confirmed multiple times the handoff to visual separation. At the last second, he even asked if they had visual as he saw the potential collision and alarms were going off. Fairly certain the fault like 100% with the helicopter pilots.
Yes, the helo pilot accepted responsibility for tracking the 'CRJ' traffic via the visual separation callout, but unfortunately identifying AA 5342 in this way is not a clear or unique way to do so. They are a common plane type and come in several sizes/configurations.
That last second call from ATC should have been more than a confirmation that they had the traffic in sight. They were less than 1000ft apart in that moment. It should have been to tell them that the Collision Avoidance ('CA') system was alerting and that they had to "pull up". Even if 'pull up' was all that was said, it would have been better than asking for a confirmation of visual separation.
I caught a podcast the other day, telling the story of a plane crash that hinged on the ambiguity of what the word "clear" meant. One of the fixes was to alter the language, so that they'd only use the word "clear" when things actually were clear. They wouldn't say things like "proceed when it's clear", just in case they mis-heard.
I'm probably not describing it very accurately, but that's the gist. And it sounds as if a similar error occurred here. I'm a little surprised that such ambiguities would still exist after all this time.
so far there doesn't seem to be any evidence that the air traffic controller contributed to the accident. the article serves as a reminder that there is a shortage of air traffic controllers across the country and this shortage has the potential to reduce safety overall
I wouldn't be so eager to jump to this conclusion.
After listening to a former pilot on this type of aircraft, who flew this very aircraft into this very airport, the many problems are clear:
- This particular helicopter was flying too high when it should've been around treetop/obstacle-avoidance level where it was
- Helicopters shouldn't be flying through an approach path of a major airport
- TCAS won't do a damn thing <1000' AGL. Perhaps subsequent versions of TCAS should address traffic around airports and down to around 200' AGL
- DCA should scale back on its traffic volume
- The approach change from 01 to 33 is awkward
- The FAA needs to exhaust all avenues to encourage, hire, and train ATC to bolster its ranks rather than send emails about how to quit or allow commercial figures to pressure its leadership to resign
Also, I really want to know if:
- The AA jet got a TCAS TA (advisory) because they definitely didn't receive an RA (warning)
- The ATC controller was in ADS-B filter mode or was seeing all data
We'll never know if:
- The chopper pilot mistook another aircraft for the AA one or was giving the answer expected due to being on NVGs in busy airspace
That last second call from ATC should have been more than a confirmation that they had the traffic in sight. They were less than 1000ft apart in that moment. It should have been to tell them that the Collision Avoidance ('CA') system was alerting and that they had to "pull up". Even if 'pull up' was all that was said, it would have been better than asking for a confirmation of visual separation.
https://timharford.com/2025/01/cautionary-tales-frozen-in-a-...
I'm probably not describing it very accurately, but that's the gist. And it sounds as if a similar error occurred here. I'm a little surprised that such ambiguities would still exist after all this time.
"Air traffic controllers were emailed by the Trump administration urging them to quit their jobs and take mass “buyouts” just 24 hours after the D.C. plane crash." - https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-admin-emails-air-traffic...
Deleted Comment
Dead Comment
After listening to a former pilot on this type of aircraft, who flew this very aircraft into this very airport, the many problems are clear:
- This particular helicopter was flying too high when it should've been around treetop/obstacle-avoidance level where it was
- Helicopters shouldn't be flying through an approach path of a major airport
- TCAS won't do a damn thing <1000' AGL. Perhaps subsequent versions of TCAS should address traffic around airports and down to around 200' AGL
- DCA should scale back on its traffic volume
- The approach change from 01 to 33 is awkward
- The FAA needs to exhaust all avenues to encourage, hire, and train ATC to bolster its ranks rather than send emails about how to quit or allow commercial figures to pressure its leadership to resign
Also, I really want to know if:
- The AA jet got a TCAS TA (advisory) because they definitely didn't receive an RA (warning)
- The ATC controller was in ADS-B filter mode or was seeing all data
We'll never know if:
- The chopper pilot mistook another aircraft for the AA one or was giving the answer expected due to being on NVGs in busy airspace
Dead Comment