Ahh yes, the guy who blames NATO for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As I'm sure everyone here is aware, NATO is a defensive alliance, so the only threat it poses is in reaction to an expansionist Russia which threatens the sovereignty of their neighbors. Now, I doubt even Mearsheimer would dispute this last point, and I'm sure he repeats all of the Russian talking points about wanting a permanent base in the Black Sea, and how unfair it is that the borders of Ukraine include Crimea, blah, blah, blah.
Please John, remind me when it was that NATO drew up the borders of the Ukraine SSR, or when, no doubt as a deliberate provocation, NATO gifted the Crimea to Ukraine. Or when NATO organized a mercenary force to illegally occupy the Donbas and annex Crimea? Surely, NATO is also responsible for Russian troops in Georgia and Moldova? John's point of view only makes sense if you consider Russia's territorial claims on their neighbors to be legitimate, which I think most people would agree they are not. If anything, we have done too little to help Ukraine prior to the current conflict, and too little to deter Putin.
From what I understand, JM doesn't believe in legitimate and immediate claims. He believes that nation states act in their own best interest and that the stronger party generally wins. It's not a statement about morality, it's trying to be objective.
You on the other hand, not only do you lay out a heart throbbing argument full of moral claims but you severely misunderstand the argument you're even arguing against. You don't have to agree with JM but at least make sure you understand what he's talking about.
I haven’t heard that part of this interview but from past speaking engagements by him I think he means they probably intended to install a friendly regime. Though in many contexts that’s not all that different, I think the difference between Russian territory and a buffer state is very significant in geopolitics.
What context am I missing here? How am I not giving a good faith interpretation when I'm listening to his entire speech on the invasion of Ukraine? I'm not going to sit here nodding my head in agreement with whatever he says. At the 45 minute mark, he repeatedly, clearly, says that Russia invading all of Ukraine, or occupying it, is preposterous and that there's "no evidence" of it. Neither Mearsheimer or Fridman at all refute the very obvious contradiction that Russian troops were surrounding and shelling the capital of Ukraine immediately during the invasion.
Mearsheimer was prescient when he advocated Ukraine be allowed to keep a strategic nuclear stockpile in the early 90s when the US admin was pushing to disarm Ukraine, post breakup of USSR.
The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent
Most Western observers want Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. In this view, articulated recently by President Bill Clinton, Europe would be more stable if Russia were to become "the only nuclear-armed successor state to the Soviet Union." The United States and its European allies have been pressing Ukraine to transfer all of the nuclear weapons on its territory to the Russians, who naturally think this is an excellent idea.
President Clinton is wrong. The conventional wisdom about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is wrong. In fact, as soon as it declared independence, Ukraine should have been quietly encouraged to fashion its own nuclear deterrent. Even now, pressing Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state is a mistake.
A nuclear Ukraine makes sense for two reasons. First, it is imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that the Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it. Ukraine cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no state, including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression. If the U.S. aim is to enhance stability in Europe, the case against a nuclear-armed Ukraine is unpersuasive.
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But, he does give Putin a pass on the invasion itself. Couldn't Putin have won the desired
concessions with just sabre-rattling and having a skirmish on the border instead of a full on invasion,
which is slowly destroying both Ukraine and Russia.
It might have been good for Ukraine right now, but I feel like Ukraine was a pretty corrupt state in the 90s or at least perceived that way. Enough that the US and EU did not want them to have nuclear weapons. Even if they were realist.
Fridman always comes off as painfully naive in conversations like these. "Aw shucks, can't two leaders just pick up the phone and have a human conversation and make the problem go away? What if the US got involved to help?" No, actually. "Well what if the US just completely abandoned their strategy in Europe and gave Russia what they want, would that make the problem go away?" Yes?
Fridman also blatantly softballs anyone he's interviewing. He will have people with opposing views on. First one, he'll agree with 90% and never seriously challenge. Next person comes in with opposite belief, he'll agree with 90% and not challenge. He offers little here, those two people should've been debating each other. Prime example is back to back interviews with Netanyahu and Yuval Noah Harari.
That's kind of his thing though he let's people talk and you make of it what you will. He has challenged people directly in the past but isn't aggressive about it.
You've identified a key misunderstanding - conflict resolution between individuals is nothing like conflict resolution between nations.
Our metaphors for nations in the Lakoffian sense[1] erroneously guide us toward the conclusion that "countries are people". Countries "want" this or "dislike" that is specifically an example of personification identified in chapter seven.
This is a dangerously leaky abstraction that when taken for granted lead to the naive conclusions you've identified like nations calling each other up and resolving some misunderstanding.
Partially, the fact that diplomatic negotiations are closed and the public has no mental model of how negotiations actually work can be blamed too. That doesn't necessarily mean that negotiations should be made public (how would that work?), but that it is a complicated contributing factor.
Political viability plays a hugely underappreciated role and simply telling the body politic "you're not going to get your way this time,"(like children) doesn't and will not work.
1. See Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1981). Metaphors we live by. University of Chicago Press.
I don't know if this is what Fridman is doing, but interviewers will often ask naive questions that they already know the answer to on behalf of an audience who might not.
Readit News
You on the other hand, not only do you lay out a heart throbbing argument full of moral claims but you severely misunderstand the argument you're even arguing against. You don't have to agree with JM but at least make sure you understand what he's talking about.
conveniently forgets the March 2022 assault on Kyiv, capital of Ukraine.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kyiv_(2022)
But, he does give Putin a pass on the invasion itself. Couldn't Putin have won the desired concessions with just sabre-rattling and having a skirmish on the border instead of a full on invasion, which is slowly destroying both Ukraine and Russia.
[1] https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mears...
Our metaphors for nations in the Lakoffian sense[1] erroneously guide us toward the conclusion that "countries are people". Countries "want" this or "dislike" that is specifically an example of personification identified in chapter seven.
This is a dangerously leaky abstraction that when taken for granted lead to the naive conclusions you've identified like nations calling each other up and resolving some misunderstanding.
Partially, the fact that diplomatic negotiations are closed and the public has no mental model of how negotiations actually work can be blamed too. That doesn't necessarily mean that negotiations should be made public (how would that work?), but that it is a complicated contributing factor.
Political viability plays a hugely underappreciated role and simply telling the body politic "you're not going to get your way this time,"(like children) doesn't and will not work.
1. See Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1981). Metaphors we live by. University of Chicago Press.