This is equivalent to basic HTTP authentication. If used over TLS it's safe-ish: The real issues arise from servers logging HTTP requests/headers and whatnot in plaintext. The two benefits of using a session over the raw password are that:
1) sessions are typically scoped in time, and
2) if the session is revealed, it can't be used for credential stuffing (using the same credentials on a different website to see if the password was used there too.)
Having said that I'm not being an apologist: The design should be better
Performance would be another benefit, wouldn't it? Password hashing algorithms are deliberately slow, so doing it for every request adds some overhead compared to doing it once and establishing a session ID. (Assuming that the passwords are hashed on the server.)
Nobody's hashing a password on every request. In this case, the cookie is used for a (very shoddily implemented) "Remember Me" feature, so the user doesn't have to login to the website every time they use it.
BuiltWith says that the CMS used at forums.lenovo.com is from Lithium Technologies, and it was first detected in July, 2012. I'm not sure if this is the forum software, or something else.
As long as it's a http only secure cookie... it should not be a huge issue. Session ids are basically replacement for username+password anyway, and nobody cares they're stored in a cookie. Server knows the plaintext password already, too.
So the only remaining issues are security issues around sharing your computer with other people, or programs. I guess stealing a session id is mildly less problematic than stealing the password in case the password is re-used elsewhere.
Servers should NOT be storing passwords in plaintext, ever. This has been clear for at least 20 years now. You should only store a salted hash of a password, and please, do not roll your own. Use one of the many popular libraries for this.
Servers routinely handle plaintext passwords when authenticating. They may not store it, but it's not something that is invisible to them, unless using some auth method that uses challenge/response instead of plaintext passwords. Most web apps use plaintext password auth.
* Re-use across sites: people unfortunately reuse passwords across services. That means that getting access to these cookies would be great for credential stuffing attacks. A session identifier is no use for that type of attack.
* Re-auth across devices: you can't typically exchange a session for another session on a different device, but you sure can do so with a password.
* Session ids can be revoked with less user impact (they have to log in again). Passwords can be revoked too (it's a password reset), but it impacts users far more.
As other comments mention, passwords should be manipulated in memory, only stored hashed and salted by a strong algorithm, and seen by the bare minimum of software. Preferably handled by software designed for handling passwords and other sensitive credentials. There are commercial options, free options, and open source options.
* Re-auth across devices: you can't typically exchange a session for another session on a different device, but you sure can do so with a password.
Ever had Google deny you access for a perfectly valid username/password combo when loging in from "unfamiliar" location? :) Or a bank ask you for SMS code when logging in from a different browser?
It really depends on level of paranoia of the authentication system. You can have user device validation even with username/password, and you may not have it for session IDs in a different implementation.
There are considerations on the performance as well.
Usually, a responsible website will password-hash the plain-text password into a hashed string before saving the hashed string into their storage. Password-hash is a special hashing process designed to be reasonability slow, so an attacker who somehow obtained the hashed string cannot easily collide the hash with another plain-text.
Some password-hash configuration can took few milliseconds to run, that's really expensive if you have to do that for every request just so you can compare the client password-hash v.s. the one stored on your server.
(Full disclosure, I designed few session manage systems for my job before :D)
And what if the server is compromised in the future? It is trivially to then extract all the cookies and send them to a attacker-controlled server. The attacker then uses those password to try to login on different platforms.
After initially setting a password, the database/server should only store a salted hash.
We know that people love to reuse passwords. We also know that enterprise software is often deployed in a rather complex, complicated, multi-layer fashion, which is to say that misconfiguring it to not use HTTPS isn't all too far fetched. Leaking a session ID is always strictly better than leaking a plaintext password and username combo.
Yes. It is not easy to 'logout' when the browser knows your basic auth credentials.
Even if the server sends a new cookie that will overwrite the basic auth cookie the browser might send it again.
1) sessions are typically scoped in time, and
2) if the session is revealed, it can't be used for credential stuffing (using the same credentials on a different website to see if the password was used there too.)
Having said that I'm not being an apologist: The design should be better
Just clarifying, do you mean basic auth with the `Authorization: Basic base64(username : password)` scheme?
But this is of course even worse because most servers log this. Headers are not often logged.
Asking as someone who works with forum software on a daily basis.
https://forums.lenovo.com/api/v1/user/getCountryByIphttps://forums.lenovo.com/api/v1/forums/getForumAccesshttps://forums.lenovo.com/api/v1/forums/getCurrentForumTreeshttps://forums.lenovo.com/api/v1/topic/getTopic?fid=6&tid=51...
Also interesting that they have no auth requirement on the getCountryByIp route
So the only remaining issues are security issues around sharing your computer with other people, or programs. I guess stealing a session id is mildly less problematic than stealing the password in case the password is re-used elsewhere.
Not even close. Why?
* Re-use across sites: people unfortunately reuse passwords across services. That means that getting access to these cookies would be great for credential stuffing attacks. A session identifier is no use for that type of attack.
* Re-auth across devices: you can't typically exchange a session for another session on a different device, but you sure can do so with a password.
* Session ids can be revoked with less user impact (they have to log in again). Passwords can be revoked too (it's a password reset), but it impacts users far more.
As other comments mention, passwords should be manipulated in memory, only stored hashed and salted by a strong algorithm, and seen by the bare minimum of software. Preferably handled by software designed for handling passwords and other sensitive credentials. There are commercial options, free options, and open source options.
(Full disclosure, I work for an auth company.)
Ever had Google deny you access for a perfectly valid username/password combo when loging in from "unfamiliar" location? :) Or a bank ask you for SMS code when logging in from a different browser?
It really depends on level of paranoia of the authentication system. You can have user device validation even with username/password, and you may not have it for session IDs in a different implementation.
Usually, a responsible website will password-hash the plain-text password into a hashed string before saving the hashed string into their storage. Password-hash is a special hashing process designed to be reasonability slow, so an attacker who somehow obtained the hashed string cannot easily collide the hash with another plain-text.
Some password-hash configuration can took few milliseconds to run, that's really expensive if you have to do that for every request just so you can compare the client password-hash v.s. the one stored on your server.
(Full disclosure, I designed few session manage systems for my job before :D)
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After initially setting a password, the database/server should only store a salted hash.
No exceptions.
I can selectively deauth a user to make them login again in short order and take his password.
It depends on the level of compromise, of course.
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Return a 401 on the "logout" page?
Not if they're HttpOnly cookies. Then it requires actually compromise/mitm of the application server code to recover the cookies.
I was able to sign up and sign in repeatedly. I never saw a 'RMEPass' cookie set, nor was I able to click 'remember me'.
So it seems like they have fixed at least one part of this issue.
[1]: Screenshot at https://forums.lenovo.com/t5/Other-Linux-Discussions/Thinkpa...
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