I tried to argue against superdeterminism the last time this came up and got a pile of downvotes because people mixed it up with determinism. And I see this is happening all over again in the comments below.
I'm not even going to try this time, I'm just going to say to everybody reading this: superdeterminism is not at all the same thing as determinism. It is a far stronger assumption with far far more unintuitive consequences for our understanding of nature. If you're reading this and just thinking "superdeterminism is okay because there's no free will", then you've been suckered by this article into believing a massive oversimplification.
I really agree with you here. Superdeterminism is much weirder and harder to accept than non-locality. Of course, with enough non-locality you'll end up with something just as awkward as superdeterminism. I'm trying learn more about decoherence as an alternative to wave-function collapse.
I'm listening to the Into to QM course from mit's open courseware [0] and I have to say that QM represents a complete break with the classical past, not because of a scientist's ambition or a quirk of history, but because the experimental evidence demands it. The evidence results in a few postulates, and QM is really the only theory that satisfies the postulates, in the sense that any theory that satisfies those postulates will look like Schroedinger's eq. The story is not over at all, we're still very much at the beginning of understanding it.
To me decoherence always seemed so obviously the solution to these 'problems in QM' that I genuinely don't understand why are still having these quasi-scientific discussions. Am I missing something or is there a ton of uninformed arm-chair science going on?
What are the scientific arguments against decoherence?
What do up-to-date theoreticians think?
Just out of curiosity, what is weird about non-locality? From my super naive perspective that's just saying that things don't necessarily work underneath the hood the way they appear to work. For me (super naive, remember ;-) ), that seems completely reasonable even if it might be very inconvenient. What am I missing?
> Superdeterminism is much weirder and harder to accept than non-locality.
I disagree, with the following example to back up why I believe it is less weird.
Superdeterminism can mean that faraway events can be correlated by a common ancestry. For instance: if you suddenly create a massive object, it will attract massive objects indiscriminately spherically; most points in space will be eventually affected, and so, they all are limited in the space of possibilities, no matter whether you can actually detect gravity.
In the case of quantum mechanics, there may well be some currently-undetectable field similar to the gravitational one, which is very chaotic at a nanoscopic level, but that is severely constrained in the shape it can form, even across large distances.
It is similar to how a large-space LCG (the PRNG) may look extremely random, but if you plotted consecutive numbers as coordinates across the complete cycle, you would get a lattice. Locally chaotic, but globally constrained.
On the other hand, non-locality means superluminar information, which really breaks the common understanding of spacetime and of causality.
"The implications of superdeterminism, if it is true, would bring into question the value of science itself by destroying falsifiability, as Anton Zeilinger has commented" [1]
> The implications of superdeterminism, if it is true, would bring into question the value of science itself by destroying falsifiability, as Anton Zeilinger has commented
Except Zeilinger is wrong. The freedom of the experimenter is not fundamental to the scientific process, rather the nature of the experimenter's complexity is what matters. Even simple deterministic algorithms can explore an entire state space, and given we are capable of simulating such algorithms with our brains (Turing completeness), we are therefore also capable of exploring the full state space of physical theories.
Furthermore, it is not a false picture of nature at all. It very clearly describes the behaviour of that which is observable, which is exactly what science is designed to do.
A simple description of superdeterminism would be that it's a theory of hidden variables where those hidden variables evolve with intelligence level complexity. It's a traditional method to evade falsifiability, yes :)
Yep. Superdeterminism as a particular physical hypothesis has nothing to do with a philosophical notion of determinism or debates about free will. The latter is really the subject of metaphysics which by definition is not physics.
It is like mixing implementation details of a particular Python script with a theory of programming languages.
Someone who knows, that determinism can be a metaphysical concept (depending on which determinism one is talking about). Not many people get that. Good to see some people actually read about it or thought about it. This is what I always try to explain to people trying to counter it with quantum mechanics, as if it was a proof against determinism.
> But because of the historical legacy, researchers who have worked on or presently work on Superdeterminism have been either ignored or ridiculed.
is too strong. I would say that the historical legacy does not have much to do with it - the reason that superdeterminism is ignored or ridiculed is that it looks absolutely wild to most physicists - much more mind-bending than the vanilla story of the Bell test, which is mad enough to begin with. That's not to say that it is ruled out - just that we have avoided it for pretty sensible reasons, rather than stupidity or some sort of blind spot.
> That's not to say that it is ruled out - just that we have avoided it for pretty sensible reasons, rather than stupidity or some sort of blind spot.
I have to question the validity of this argument, because generations of physicists have been taught to give up realism in order to accept QM. Superdeterminism is no weirder than giving up realism, it's just a weirdness to which you've grown accustomed.
I think of superdeterminism not as a theory but as a barometer - the Bell's Theorem world we live in is baffling enough that people are willing to consider superdeterminism as an explanation.
> There is no such thing as a controlled experiment
> The superdeterministic explanation is: "well, there's nothing to explain. You were simply determined to lose by the initial conditions of the universe. It couldn't have gone any other way."
This eventually led me to a quote from Anton Zeilinger about his dislike for it.
> I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.
My question is, does it matter if we are seeing a false picture as long as the result of experiments within it are consistent and lead to new discoveries that themselves are actionable? If everything we experience is in this “false picture” is it really false or simply a different set of rules based on underlying circumstances.
I think the whole point being made by the authors here is that QM is dead-ending and that superdeterminism could give us more answers, not less. Why not see if it leads somewhere?
Superdeterminism is like the whole existence being a Haskell program without I/O. To get anything actionable we'll have to logically separate parts of it...
In general all these interpretations are more popular on the technically literate web going culture than in actual research in physics where Copenhagen style views still predominate.
For the simple reason that all of the other interpretations (Many Worlds, Bohmian, Transactional) only somewhat work with Non-Relativistic QM not with QFT. Only Copenhagen works with QFT.
No no, arguing is important. It lubricates an essential step in the scientific process. No one can design experiments, let alone predict results or even understand results, without understanding.
Not just the way it's arbitrarily hard from an engineering perspective to design an experiment to disprove string theory. It is theoretically impossible, the way it's impossible to distinguish between Copenhagen and many worlds.
Determinism simply means the nature of things is deterministic, that's all. In other words, that is: given all initial conditions you can determine the exact resulting conditions.
Bell coined the term "Superdeterminism" to describe to others of theories that evade his own theorem - theories which are absolutely and completely deterministic. Theories that are only partially deterministic - don't hold up to his theorem. Hence he coined this term to highlight the difference (to those that fail to understand), which again is absolutely/completely vs partially deterministic theories.
As so there's no real difference here. If you understand determinism, then you know that a "partially" deterministic theory is not actually deterministic...
I see the difference between determinism and superdeterminism but it's unclear to me why, if you accept the former, why you might not accept the latter.
I think it's worth thinking through and delineating superdeterminism to its utmost limits even if I wouldn't necessarily say I find it compelling.
I do wonder why the authors are so quick to reject nonreductionism though, as nonreductionism seems fairly reasonable to me. Maybe I have a different idea of nonreductionism, but it seems to me that rejecting nonreductionism is akin to accepting Laplace's demon which as far as I understand has been disproved. Basically, at some point the information in a system supercedes that of any system that might represent it faithfully, in part because of measurement effects -- there's a lot of parallels with QM issues.
The problem is determining what determinism determines and how it determines it. And that's a precondition before you can even consider superdeterminism.
There is nothing in classical physics that suggests the universe is deterministic on cosmic scales. There's plenty in physics which suggests it isn't.
If you want to propose any form of determinism, be it superdeterminism, a bulk universe, or any of the other popular variations, you have to start by proving that causality is infinitely precise and absolute. Because otherwise your causality is partly random and therefore not truly causal at all.
Our experience of causality suggests that real measurements have limited precision, and predictions can only be made on limited timescales.
So anyone who is proposing superdeterminism is claiming that this can be fixed - by hidden variables, with noise-free super-realistic precision, which allow a universe-wide predictive horizon.
Free will is a side issue here, because the problem doesn't go away even if the universe has no observers.
The problem isn't whether free will hides super-predictive hidden variables, it's whether it's plausible that super-predictive hidden variables exist at all.
If you believe they do, you have a first-order universe in which these mysterious entities operate with effectively infinite precision behind the scenes, to create a second-order universe which has limited precision in practice.
Of course that may be happening. But it seems like quite unlikely.
You believe that magic ad-hoc random variables are more plausible? And that somehow for whatever non-causal (so magic) reason they follow the same probability distribution?
This is clearly epistemologically weaker, but seduce more the wishful thinker mind.
> you have a first-order universe in which these mysterious entities operate with effectively infinite precision behind the scenes, to create a second-order universe which has limited precision in practice
There are analogues to this in mathematics, for example, our formulation of the Fourier transform has limited precision but the physical phenomenon it relates to has no reason to be limited.
Funny, a couple of days ago I googled about superdeterminism again to see if there are any developments and came across Hossenfelder's and Palmer's paper on arxiv https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.06462 . Strangely enough, even though I've studied theoretical Physics, the fact that some of Quantum mechanic's claims are based on assumptions such as the fact we have free will, were never really discussed except in a course in the Philosophy of science I took, which, unfortunately, was not very scientific. I actually never heard about superdeterminism until I read one of Gerard 't Hooft's papers (see e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.1548https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.02874). Universities should put more emphasis on teaching the things we take for granted and give students the opportunity to question them, if we want to further our understanding.
Superdeterminism in general is a pretty absurd idea. It basically says the measurement settings you choose were predetermined. But you can use a random source from another galaxy to select them. So something like the configuration of stars in another galaxy must be conspiring to help you choose just the correct settings to fake the results QM predicts, instead of QM being actually true.
In QM, configurations may be "close together" in a way that defies intuition. An example is spatially separated, entangled particles.
So why can't configurations be "far apart" in a way that defies intuition? We model measuring at 45.01° as a perturbation of 45°, but perhaps these are very distant configurations.
I do not understand your statement. Superdeterminism does not imply QM is wrong. You can not dismiss superdeterminism with the pretext that it would render everything pointless as our paths are predetermined. Basically you are arguing that you choose not to consider superdeterminism because you have free will. What sounds more absurd? I suggest you read the original paper for a better reply to your argument.
It's not literally saying QM is false in the sense of "gives wrong predictions", but it is saying it is not "what is really going on", because it is incomplete.
> it would render everything pointless as our paths are predetermined
The objection is subtler than this. It's that it's pointless because it's not a productive stance. Science is in large part about predicting results of interventions. It throws its hands up and says everything happens for essentially conspiratorial reasons, and taken fully doesn't admit the possibility of interventions. Further this is stronger than the normal determinism of classical mechanics -- there, even if we believe in determinism, nondeterminism with respect to unobserved things (such as experimenters brains) is a useful stance for discovering truths about the universe. In contrast, with superdeterminism, any possible "intervention" in this stance is "compensated for" by the initial conditions. It explains quantum mechanics only by saying "initial conditions did it", which is no better than "God did it" of medieval philosophy. In neither case can we usefully ask further questions.
We paradoxically could have free will and still live in a purely deterministic universe. Even if it is deterministic, we could never do the math to determine the exact state of everything. Our inability to model the universe (without a universe sized computer) means for all intents and purposes we do have free will. Even if the arrow of time runs backwards and our perception is forward, I'm still going to pick what I eat for dinner tonight.
I see it more as if the universe was a 4D picture, with time as the 4th dimension, any concept of time "going forward" is just an illusion by how our brains work (we need time to compute every moment), so the outcomes are already written, we just havent seen it.
I have long been a fan of the 4d fixed universe. If you think of fractals you can get a hint at how everything is interrelated. As you indicated, the fundamental issue is why we experience the passage of time. I dont think it's an illusion, but the most important question.
The way I get is that we are measuring something with itself. Measuring an unknown attribute with something (actually the same thing) having the same unknown attribute. We cannot predetermine the settings of the measurement as we do not know its attributes or parameters. We have no means of calibrating something we do not know. It does not have to be an atom from a distant galaxy - very well may be, we do not know yet - but unknown underlying interdependence locally. The superposition of unknown number of underlying unknowns combine into what happens when we measure an unknown with an other unknown. We measure our universe with itself, the taste of an apple with an other apple.
Is there any coherent fixed theory of superdeterminism at all? Something with a system of equations that are nailed down and that one could build solid thought experiments on top of?
The article mentions it but kind of downplays the fact that the prevailing theory of QM has a very clear mathematical formalism without any wiggle room, while superdeterminism doesn't have this.
That seems like a far better explanation for why QM has won, and makes me wonder whether superdeterminism wouldn't just be the next string theory.
It makes a strong case IMHO that there is some meat here. The main idea is that Bell inequalities make ~4 assumptions, which Hossenfelder and Palmer argue can be meanifully weakened in precise ways that have the potential for testable predictions.
The paper also spends some time dispelling the FUD that stems from the unfortunate associations made with the name "superdeterminism."
It's only ~20 pages of mostly prose, so if you're interested, I highly recommend the quick read.
Superdeterminism isn't supposed to be an alternative to QM, usually it's an alternative interpretation of QM which allows hidden variables from what i've gathered.
To a computer scientist, superdeterminism seems like the most elegant solution to most of the current problems in physics. But it has always been firmly out of the mainstream, perhaps because it runs directly counter to our human experience. Gerard t'Hoofts framing of the universe as a cellular automaton (https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.1548) is relatively intuitive, but still only a rough sketch. Hopefully, Hossenfelder and Palmer now publicly arguing for superdeterminism will recruit some more bright minds to fleshing out these models into workable theories.
Two statistical dependent variables "can be made" independent, for example by feeding one into an PRNG. This seems like a similar cop-out as the "particle changes behaviour when it is observed hence consciousness is needed in the universe"
> Two statistical dependent variables "can be made" independent, for example by feeding one into an PRNG
No statistical test can assure statistical independence for all possible cases. The very fact that you pipe it through a PRNG means the output is deterministically correlated with the input, because PRNGs are deterministic, and some statistical test will be able to detect it. At the base level, a test that tries every conceivable PRNG, for instance.
Superdeterminism appears to aspire to come up with a classical model that would explain quantum correlation. If successful it would render a quantum computer to be fancy, highly parallel, very expensive but still a classical one. A non-classical superdeterministic model would just substitute one mystery for another (sneaked in non-locality or something).
Everything old is new again. Superdeterminism is basically the concept that everything follows from the initial conditions of the universe in a deterministic fashion. In short, it's a clockwork universe below the quantum level. It is compatible with Bell's theorem because it's not local hidden variables, it's global hidden variables--i.e. the state of the entire universe.
The problem is, according to my current understanding, superdeterminism cannot be tested.
This is the my first time reading about Superdeterminism and the author hits on my of my amature/novice intuitions on issues like the measurement problem, hidden variables, and Bell's theorem (call me weird but these are topics I enjoy reading, studying, and thinking about--technically and philosophically).
I'd be very interested in hearing and explanation and understanding why superdeterminism cannot be tested (it's not clearly obvious to me how that's the case) because if that is the case, it would explain why it was largely unpursued/undeveloped (similar to what someone else in this thread posted--if it's true, it supposeldy offers little useful insight beyond better explaining issues in quantum mechanics by replacing one blackbox of uncertainty with another).
Based on the author's description, much of the issue is that the theory has had little attention and as such, is largely undeveloped (and therefore, isn't going to be developed enough for experimental testing).
> I'd be very interested in hearing and explanation and understanding why superdeterminism cannot be tested
What experiment could you run in a superdetermined universe that would distinguish it from a non-superdetermined universe? Vice versa? There's nothing.
Readit News
I'm not even going to try this time, I'm just going to say to everybody reading this: superdeterminism is not at all the same thing as determinism. It is a far stronger assumption with far far more unintuitive consequences for our understanding of nature. If you're reading this and just thinking "superdeterminism is okay because there's no free will", then you've been suckered by this article into believing a massive oversimplification.
I'm listening to the Into to QM course from mit's open courseware [0] and I have to say that QM represents a complete break with the classical past, not because of a scientist's ambition or a quirk of history, but because the experimental evidence demands it. The evidence results in a few postulates, and QM is really the only theory that satisfies the postulates, in the sense that any theory that satisfies those postulates will look like Schroedinger's eq. The story is not over at all, we're still very much at the beginning of understanding it.
[0] https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/physics/8-04-quantum-physics-i-s...
What are the scientific arguments against decoherence? What do up-to-date theoreticians think?
I disagree, with the following example to back up why I believe it is less weird.
Superdeterminism can mean that faraway events can be correlated by a common ancestry. For instance: if you suddenly create a massive object, it will attract massive objects indiscriminately spherically; most points in space will be eventually affected, and so, they all are limited in the space of possibilities, no matter whether you can actually detect gravity.
In the case of quantum mechanics, there may well be some currently-undetectable field similar to the gravitational one, which is very chaotic at a nanoscopic level, but that is severely constrained in the shape it can form, even across large distances.
It is similar to how a large-space LCG (the PRNG) may look extremely random, but if you plotted consecutive numbers as coordinates across the complete cycle, you would get a lattice. Locally chaotic, but globally constrained.
On the other hand, non-locality means superluminar information, which really breaks the common understanding of spacetime and of causality.
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism
Except Zeilinger is wrong. The freedom of the experimenter is not fundamental to the scientific process, rather the nature of the experimenter's complexity is what matters. Even simple deterministic algorithms can explore an entire state space, and given we are capable of simulating such algorithms with our brains (Turing completeness), we are therefore also capable of exploring the full state space of physical theories.
Furthermore, it is not a false picture of nature at all. It very clearly describes the behaviour of that which is observable, which is exactly what science is designed to do.
It is like mixing implementation details of a particular Python script with a theory of programming languages.
> But because of the historical legacy, researchers who have worked on or presently work on Superdeterminism have been either ignored or ridiculed.
is too strong. I would say that the historical legacy does not have much to do with it - the reason that superdeterminism is ignored or ridiculed is that it looks absolutely wild to most physicists - much more mind-bending than the vanilla story of the Bell test, which is mad enough to begin with. That's not to say that it is ruled out - just that we have avoided it for pretty sensible reasons, rather than stupidity or some sort of blind spot.
I have to question the validity of this argument, because generations of physicists have been taught to give up realism in order to accept QM. Superdeterminism is no weirder than giving up realism, it's just a weirdness to which you've grown accustomed.
> There is no such thing as a controlled experiment
> The superdeterministic explanation is: "well, there's nothing to explain. You were simply determined to lose by the initial conditions of the universe. It couldn't have gone any other way."
This eventually led me to a quote from Anton Zeilinger about his dislike for it.
> I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.
My question is, does it matter if we are seeing a false picture as long as the result of experiments within it are consistent and lead to new discoveries that themselves are actionable? If everything we experience is in this “false picture” is it really false or simply a different set of rules based on underlying circumstances.
I think the whole point being made by the authors here is that QM is dead-ending and that superdeterminism could give us more answers, not less. Why not see if it leads somewhere?
>authors here is that QM is dead-ending
Copenhagen is dead-ending, not QM.
For the simple reason that all of the other interpretations (Many Worlds, Bohmian, Transactional) only somewhat work with Non-Relativistic QM not with QFT. Only Copenhagen works with QFT.
Not just the way it's arbitrarily hard from an engineering perspective to design an experiment to disprove string theory. It is theoretically impossible, the way it's impossible to distinguish between Copenhagen and many worlds.
Bell coined the term "Superdeterminism" to describe to others of theories that evade his own theorem - theories which are absolutely and completely deterministic. Theories that are only partially deterministic - don't hold up to his theorem. Hence he coined this term to highlight the difference (to those that fail to understand), which again is absolutely/completely vs partially deterministic theories.
As so there's no real difference here. If you understand determinism, then you know that a "partially" deterministic theory is not actually deterministic...
I think it's worth thinking through and delineating superdeterminism to its utmost limits even if I wouldn't necessarily say I find it compelling.
I do wonder why the authors are so quick to reject nonreductionism though, as nonreductionism seems fairly reasonable to me. Maybe I have a different idea of nonreductionism, but it seems to me that rejecting nonreductionism is akin to accepting Laplace's demon which as far as I understand has been disproved. Basically, at some point the information in a system supercedes that of any system that might represent it faithfully, in part because of measurement effects -- there's a lot of parallels with QM issues.
There is nothing in classical physics that suggests the universe is deterministic on cosmic scales. There's plenty in physics which suggests it isn't.
If you want to propose any form of determinism, be it superdeterminism, a bulk universe, or any of the other popular variations, you have to start by proving that causality is infinitely precise and absolute. Because otherwise your causality is partly random and therefore not truly causal at all.
Our experience of causality suggests that real measurements have limited precision, and predictions can only be made on limited timescales.
So anyone who is proposing superdeterminism is claiming that this can be fixed - by hidden variables, with noise-free super-realistic precision, which allow a universe-wide predictive horizon.
Free will is a side issue here, because the problem doesn't go away even if the universe has no observers.
The problem isn't whether free will hides super-predictive hidden variables, it's whether it's plausible that super-predictive hidden variables exist at all.
If you believe they do, you have a first-order universe in which these mysterious entities operate with effectively infinite precision behind the scenes, to create a second-order universe which has limited precision in practice.
Of course that may be happening. But it seems like quite unlikely.
There are analogues to this in mathematics, for example, our formulation of the Fourier transform has limited precision but the physical phenomenon it relates to has no reason to be limited.
So why can't configurations be "far apart" in a way that defies intuition? We model measuring at 45.01° as a perturbation of 45°, but perhaps these are very distant configurations.
> it would render everything pointless as our paths are predetermined
The objection is subtler than this. It's that it's pointless because it's not a productive stance. Science is in large part about predicting results of interventions. It throws its hands up and says everything happens for essentially conspiratorial reasons, and taken fully doesn't admit the possibility of interventions. Further this is stronger than the normal determinism of classical mechanics -- there, even if we believe in determinism, nondeterminism with respect to unobserved things (such as experimenters brains) is a useful stance for discovering truths about the universe. In contrast, with superdeterminism, any possible "intervention" in this stance is "compensated for" by the initial conditions. It explains quantum mechanics only by saying "initial conditions did it", which is no better than "God did it" of medieval philosophy. In neither case can we usefully ask further questions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-theory_of_time
The article mentions it but kind of downplays the fact that the prevailing theory of QM has a very clear mathematical formalism without any wiggle room, while superdeterminism doesn't have this.
That seems like a far better explanation for why QM has won, and makes me wonder whether superdeterminism wouldn't just be the next string theory.
It makes a strong case IMHO that there is some meat here. The main idea is that Bell inequalities make ~4 assumptions, which Hossenfelder and Palmer argue can be meanifully weakened in precise ways that have the potential for testable predictions.
The paper also spends some time dispelling the FUD that stems from the unfortunate associations made with the name "superdeterminism."
It's only ~20 pages of mostly prose, so if you're interested, I highly recommend the quick read.
To a computer scientist, superdeterminism seems like the most elegant solution to most of the current problems in physics. But it has always been firmly out of the mainstream, perhaps because it runs directly counter to our human experience. Gerard t'Hoofts framing of the universe as a cellular automaton (https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.1548) is relatively intuitive, but still only a rough sketch. Hopefully, Hossenfelder and Palmer now publicly arguing for superdeterminism will recruit some more bright minds to fleshing out these models into workable theories.
Two statistical dependent variables "can be made" independent, for example by feeding one into an PRNG. This seems like a similar cop-out as the "particle changes behaviour when it is observed hence consciousness is needed in the universe"
(And this answer explained it better https://www.quora.com/Why-do-some-crackpot-scientists-go-aft... as usual for Quora, awful questions with great answers)
No statistical test can assure statistical independence for all possible cases. The very fact that you pipe it through a PRNG means the output is deterministically correlated with the input, because PRNGs are deterministic, and some statistical test will be able to detect it. At the base level, a test that tries every conceivable PRNG, for instance.
In practice the universe can't know all the ways you can mix-up a variable
The problem is, according to my current understanding, superdeterminism cannot be tested.
I'd be very interested in hearing and explanation and understanding why superdeterminism cannot be tested (it's not clearly obvious to me how that's the case) because if that is the case, it would explain why it was largely unpursued/undeveloped (similar to what someone else in this thread posted--if it's true, it supposeldy offers little useful insight beyond better explaining issues in quantum mechanics by replacing one blackbox of uncertainty with another).
Based on the author's description, much of the issue is that the theory has had little attention and as such, is largely undeveloped (and therefore, isn't going to be developed enough for experimental testing).
What experiment could you run in a superdetermined universe that would distinguish it from a non-superdetermined universe? Vice versa? There's nothing.