And why is `ptrace` needed?
As for ptrace, I use it to inject code into the users shell to present the command in a way that doesn’t require further interaction to run. I wanted it to be more like the “AI terminal” experience without requiring the user to copy-paste the recommended command back into their shell prompt.
I don’t love the idea of giving every server I connect to via TLS the ability to fingerprint me by how recently (or not) I’ve fetched MTC treeheads. Even worse if this is in client hello, where anyone on the network path can view it either per connection or for my DoH requests to bootstrap encrypted client hello.
You may want to pull landmarks from CAs outside of The Approved Set™ for inclusion in what your machine trusts, and this means you'll need data from somewhere else periodically. All the usual privacy concerns over how you get what from where apply; if you're doing a web transaction a third party may be able to see your DNS lookup, your connection to port 443, and the amount of traffic you exchange, but they shouldn't be able to see what you asked for or what you go. Your OS or browser can snitch on you as normal, though.
I don't personally see any new privacy threats, but I may not have considered all angles.
I could see the list of client-supplied available roots being added to client fingerprinting code for passive monitoring (e.g. JA4) if it’s in the client hello, or for the benefit of just the server if it’s encrypted in transit.
Unless you're asking every user to manually input a TURN password and they promise not to give it out, you're basically forced to reveal it to every visitor of your site.
Line of sight free space optics can be immune to many many forms of jamming. Its usage dots the sci books I've read over the years, but almost always for scary reasons.
Here's the Navy today announcing work on AirBorne System for Optical Relay and Broadcast (ABSORB), a (for now) low-cost prototype one-to-many (I maybe mis-inferring what multi-access means?) relayable free space system, https://defence-blog.com/us-navy-plans-to-revolutionize-nava...
https://www.doncio.navy.mil/chips/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=555...
Spitballing here, would it still meet the needs of the protocol if the client offered which MTCAs it has (no version information), the server sends back some “typical” depth (say, 3 levels up the tree), then the client can decide to either: * Accept the MTC * Request a deeper traversal, following some super linear growth like fib numbers. In that case, they’d communicate “give me up to 5 nodes above your leaf” * Reject the MTC * Request the full certificate for “traditional” validation
The server still has a side channel for “how recently updated is this client” by knowing how many levels of inclusion proofs needed to be shared, but this is much less signal than knowing exactly which landmarks a client has.