The next issue is that it doesn't do much explaining. If it is attempting to explain qualia, it needs to explain how the functional descriptions on offer help in explaining why there is a qualitative feel associated with conscious states. If it's not attempting to explain qualia, then it needs to clearly identify the functional problem it is proposing to solve, then explain how the theory solves it. Many homegrown theories mistake description for explanation. Just giving existing functions a new name in the guise of a new framework doesn't explain anything. A reframing can be useful, but it should be made explicit that the theory is a reframing rather than an explanation, and what benefits this framing gives to solving various problems related to consciousness.
Another issue is that it spends too much time talking about implications and not enough time just communicating the core ideas. Each major section has like a paragraph or two. This isn't enough for a proper introduction to the section, let alone a sufficient description of the theory.
Consciousness isn’t just a spotlight, it’s the forced arbitration of billions of cellular demands. Each of our ~40 trillion cells has a survival stake and pushes its signals upward until the mind must take notice. That’s why certain experiences intrude on us whether we like it or not: grief that overwhelms reason, sexual arousal that derails attention, the impossibility of not laughing at an inappropriate moment, or the heat of embarrassment that turns thought itself into a hostage.
In that sense, qualia aren’t mystical paint on top of neural function — they’re the felt residue of our cells voting, insisting their needs be weighed in the conscious workspace. The Predictive Timeline Simulation framework is my attempt to make that arbitration explicit — testable in neuroscience, relevant to psychiatry, and useful for AI models.
Perhaps read the paper instead of skimming or running it through an AI. I believe that your complete understanding would either sharpen your criticisms or perhaps improve the paper.
The next issue is that it doesn't do much explaining. If it is attempting to explain qualia, it needs to explain how the functional descriptions on offer help in explaining why there is a qualitative feel associated with conscious states. If it's not attempting to explain qualia, then it needs to clearly identify the functional problem it is proposing to solve, then explain how the theory solves it. Many homegrown theories mistake description for explanation. Just giving existing functions a new name in the guise of a new framework doesn't explain anything. A reframing can be useful, but it should be made explicit that the theory is a reframing rather than an explanation, and what benefits this framing gives to solving various problems related to consciousness.
Another issue is that it spends too much time talking about implications and not enough time just communicating the core ideas. Each major section has like a paragraph or two. This isn't enough for a proper introduction to the section, let alone a sufficient description of the theory.
• I am not claiming to solve the Hard Problem of qualia. I position qualia as an evolved data format, a functional necessity for navigating a deterministic universe — not as metaphysical mystery. • What the paper does aim to explain is the predictive, timeline-simulating function of consciousness, and how errors in this function (e.g. Simulation Misfiling) may map to psychiatric conditions. • The “implications” section is deliberately forward-looking, but I agree the exposition could be expanded. That’s the next step — this is a framework, not the final word.
If nothing else, I hope the paper makes explicit that reframing consciousness as a predictive timeline simulator is testable, bridges physics + neuroscience, and invites experiments rather than mysticism.
Imagine your mind's eye traveling down a hallway of pictures. Some are memories, some are what your senses are actually experiencing, and some are products of your imagination. There are occasionally branch points where you can choose a path depending on which pictures you see down each hallway. Some pictures are scary, some are enticing. Your mood or goal influences which path you'll choose. Many of these pictures are pictures of you in various situations. They could be as simple as you at the top of the stairs you're currently climbing, or as intricate and abstract as you at the pinnacle of your career 15 years from now. Once you get to a picture that's only slightly different from your current situation, your subconscious mind can choose to make it happen -- moving muscles to take the next step, speaking the next word in a sentence shown in the image, etc.
Consciousness is the path you take through this network of images. In real life it happens so fast you don't experience the choosing of paths, and it's not really a visual hallway but rather a fusion of senses and emotions.
I'm not particularly extroverted and being organised doesn't come naturally to me either, so this type of thing is even more of a nuisance. I'm putting in effort to set up fun things to do using calendars and spreadsheets and research, I'm making notes about interests and mutual friends, and the other person can't even set up a two month calendar event then write "Hey, let's get coffee"?
For example, I can't unconsciously read expressions. I scored worse than blind guessing on the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test". So I consciously learned to read and mimic expressions, literally using a textbook for theater performers. So now I can score at the upper range of neurotypical people.
Other introverts often have problems recognizing social cues or initiating conversations. Purely because it's not _natural_ for them, even though they might _want_ to actually speak to people.
So is it kind of performative? Yes. But think about this, extroverts are doing a lot of same tricks subconsciously. Does it mean that they're _always_ performing?